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Current Issues In Probate Estate
Income Tax Allocation
John M. Gradwohl*
I. INTRODUCTION
The tax laws cast a maze of various tasks upon the person who
is selected to be the executor' of a probate estate. One of the
most perplexing areas today is that of how to allocate the estate's
income tax burden.
The estate in administration is provided with certain generally
favorable income tax provisions. It may well be, however, that in a
significant number of cases the most valuable single income tax
benefit in favor of the estate is an ability to apportion its tax bur-
den among the beneficiaries so as to save taxes. In other estates,
the same income tax allocation rules may operate to impair seri-
ously the normal probate administration. To the executor, the
problem becomes one of having to make a series of choices involving
valuable financial consequences, often between competing indi-
viduals or groups interested in the estate, and in many cases be-
yond the normally conceived concepts of executor action and fiduci-
ary responsibility.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, to analyze the ex-
tent to which under existing law the income tax burden of a pro-
bate estate may be apportioned among its various recipients in a
manner to minimize taxes-with special emphasis on the areas in
which the conscientious executor will face perilous situations, the
executor motivated to cut tax corners will find the path clear, and
probate judges and treasury personnel will find stress put on the
* B.S. 1951, LL.B. (cum laude) 1953, University of Nebraska; LL.M. 1957,
Harvard University; member Nebraska Bar Association; presently associated
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I The term "executor" is used to include "executor" and "administrator"
by whatever title designated, or any other court appointed custodian of
decedents' property. References to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A
Stat. (1954), are abbreviated "I.R.C." References to final regulations under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in effect on January 1, 1958, are abbre-
viated "Reg."
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normal functioning of decendents' estate administration and income
tax administration. Second, to consider suggested changes in the
existing estate income tax, and to present a proposal for revision.
II. ALLOCATION OF INCOME TAX BURDEN UNDER
PRESENT LAW
The extent to which under existing law the income tax burden
of a probate estate may be apportioned among its beneficiaries
so as to save taxes is of critical importance where possibly conflict-
ing interests in the estate are present. Unless competing interests
are at stake on the issue, the choice is primarily one of making the
technical selection necessary to save taxes.2 The real imponder-
ables of the present code lie where there are (A) competing inter-
est groups or individuals, with respect to (B) a probate adminis-
tration income tax duty or choice having valuable financial effects.
The opportunities for allocation of income tax among the estate
recipients in order to save total tax dollars will, of course, depend
upon the factual setting of the particular estate. To evaluate the
worth of the mechanics of the present code in achieving a desir-
able incidence of the income tax burden of a probate estate, it is
necessary to explore the outer boundaries of permissible alloca-
tion, and the consequences of the current issues present within
those boundaries.
A. IDENTITY OF COMPETING INTEREST GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS
For the purposes of this paper in analyzing the extent to which
there are conflicting interests with respect to the income tax
aspects of probate administration, the following chart may be help-
ful to represent graphically the broad lines upon which these vari-
2 For recent material dealing generally with an executor's income tax
duties and problems, see Falsey, Income Tax Planning (And Pitfalls) In The
Administration of Decedents' Estates, 30 Conn. Bar J. 260 (1956); Ofsthun,
Income Tax Saving Techniques Available To An Executor, 44 Ill. Bar J. 588
(1956); Bronston, Tax Problems In Probating Estates, 37 Chi. Bar Rec. 263
(1956); Sutter, Income Taxation of Estates, 95 Trusts And Estates 1108 (1956);
Alexander, Two Current Income Tax Problems of Executors, 29 Ohio Bar
Ass'n Rep. 752 (1956). For comparable problems under the 1939 Code, see
Baker, Income Tax Planning For Executors, 9 Tax L. Rev. 281 (1954). For
income taxation of estates and trusts, see Kamin, Surrey, and Warren, The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 1237 (1954); Michaelson, Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts
(1955); Fillman, Selections From Subchapter J, 10 Tax L. Rev. 453 (1955).
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Decedent's property may pass in a manner which will cause
the recipient to pay or contribute to the income tax on amounts
earned by the estate during administration, to have individual
income tax consequences based upon probate estate decisions, or
to be charged with a portion of the federal estate tax. Interests in
this type of property are classified as "taxable interests," and will
relate to property which will be included in the gross estate for
estate tax purposes.
Within the taxable interest group, there is (i) property which
passes through the probate estate, and (ii) property which is not
a part of the probate estate but which is included in the gross
estate for estate tax purposes. Property disposed of by decedent's
last will and testament or left for intestacy passes through his
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probate estate. Other interests, such as jointly owned property, an
intervivos trust with retained incidents of ownership, and life in-
surance proceeds on a policy owned by decedent and payable to
a named individual beneficiary, are transferred outside of the pro-
bate estate, but are within the estate tax gross estate. It will be
significant to note the extent to which the nonprobate property is
subjected to certain tax actions of the probate executor.
Persons who receive probate property or nonprobate property
may be concerned with either income tax or estate tax aspects of
the administration, or both. Where the interest is transferred free
of estate tax or income tax or both, it may -be labelled as a non-
taxable interest to that degree. For example, a spouse receiving a
formula bequest qualifying for the estate tax marital deduction
will, if a state apportionment statute or similar testamentary di-
rection is applicable, have a nontaxable interest insofar as the
estate tax is involved. The interest may pass to the spouse either
within or outside of the probate estate. But if probate estate prop-
erty is involved, the spouse may be subject to the payment of in-
come tax on amounts earned by the estate during administration, 3
and in the case of either probate or nonprobate estate property, other
individual income tax consequences may be based upon actions of the
probate executor.4 The recipient of a bequest of specific property
or of a specific sum of money paid in not more than three install-
ments would be a contributor to estate tax, but might not be liable
for any tax on estate income.5 A residuary legatee has both income
tax and estate tax worries.
How the different interests will actually line up in a particular
estate will vary as much as the dispositive arrangements in the
estates involved. As a practical matter, the probate estate may con-
tain any mixture of interests, from those estates with only per-
sonal belongings and items in everyday use (and probably some
3 This is an aspect of the distributable net income rules, discussed at pages
338-348 below, and specifically, pages 343-344.
•1 These could involve any of the income tax consequences discussed in
this paper, but see especially the use of elective deductions, pages 355-364
below, and valuation and optional valuation, pages 364-366 below. The estate
tax marital deduction provides no immunity from the problems discussed
herein; in fact, the operation of the deduction, itself, may be impaired in
certain cases. See notes 55 and 56 below; Estate of Levy, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16
(Surr. Ct. 1957).
5 See I.R.C. § 663 (a) (1). This would depend upon the specific property
involved. The recipient might be subject to an income tax on income
received by the estate from the specific property bequeathed. Cf. I.R.C.
§ 663 (c). See pages 339-340 below.
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income in respect of a decedent), to estates in which the entire
property passes through probate as a springboard to the eventual
testamentary plan. Issues of allocation between conflicting interests
could involve virtually every possible combination. For example:
(i) The rules of distributable net income applicable to estate dis-
tributions will involve problems of allocation only with respect
to the individual persons falling within GROUP 1, the probate in-
come tax group. It will be seen, however, that in many cases the
persons who fall within this group and will be required to pay an
income tax based upon the estate's income will not be the same
individuals who receive the income in the fiduciary accounts.6
(ii) Whether property is brought into or -excluded from the pro-
bate estate might make a difference solely as to whether the re-
cipient is within GROUP 1 (probate income tax group) or GROUP 2
(nonprobate income tax group), and the income taxed to the estate
rather than the individual. But if only the probate residuary estate
pays the estate tax, then bringing the property into the probate
estate might convert a nontaxable interest, GROUP 5 (nontaxable
interest passing through the gross estate), into a taxable interest,
GROUP 3 (probate estate tax group).7 (iii) The elective use of
certain expenses for estate tax or income tax will pit the interests
of GROUPS 3 and 4, as estate tax payers, against GROUP 1, the
probate income tax paying group.8 (iv) Use of an optional valua-
tion date may mean that at the expense of paying a higher estate
tax by GROUPS 3 and 4 (estate tax groups), GROUPS 1 and 2
(income tax groups) will receive a higher basis for future income
tax purposes.9
In addition, the intensity of interest of the different individuals
concerned will vary. A high income tax bracket beneficiary may
be more concerned with income tax than estate tax, while a lower
income tax bracket beneficiary may prefer to attempt to keep the
0 This is one aspect of the distribution rules discussed at pages 338 et seq.
below. It is recognized that the chart is not technically precise insofar as it
contains within GROUP 1 both persons who are concerned with the income
earned by the estate during administration and persons whose income tax
may be affected by other probate decisions, such as the valuation or optional
valuation which provides an income tax basis. This was done in the interests
of simplicity of illustration.
7 This is one aspect of the determination of property falling within an
income tax "estate" discussed at pages 335-338 below.
8 The elective deductions are a phase of the interaction of income tax
with estate tax and are discussed at pages 355-364 below.
9 Optional valuation is a phase of the interaction of income tax with
estate tax and is discussed at pages 364-366 below.
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estate tax down even if his own personal income tax is somewhat
increased. The type of property involved, and its nature, use, and
character, will also have an effect in determining the intensity of
interest of the individual recipient.
Certain nontaxable interests may be transferred from the
decedent outside of his estate tax gross estate-for example, irre-
vocable intervivos trusts and life insurance proceeds where the
reversionary interest in the decedent was less than 5%, if the
decedent had no retained rights. These interests fall into GROUP 6.
It does not seem that any purely income tax actions of the pro-
bate executor would affect the interests of this group, although
other tax-motivated moves might change the financial rights of
even this group receiving nontaxable interests outside of the
estate tax gross estate.'0
It should be noted that there are many convincing reasons for
avoiding a probate estate to the extent consistent with the over-all
estate management objectives." The problems discussed in this
paper may be added thereto, although in some situations the ability
to manipulate income taxes during administration could become a
useful tool.
This preliminary analysis suggests only a portion of the com-
peting interests of groups and individuals which may be affected
by the various income tax decisions of the executor. The numerous
interests will be explored further in the next section, which con-
siders the extent to which they become involved in the duties and
choices of the executor in allocating the income tax burden of the
estate.
B. PROBATE ADMINISTRATION TAX DUTIES OR CHOICES AFFECTING
COMPETING INTERESTS
Exploring the outer boundaries of the area in which an allo-
cation of the income tax burden of a probate estate may be made
involves: (1) Application of the estate and trust income tax allo-
cation provisions, and (2) Interaction of income tax with estate
tax. In viewing these problems, one should also keep in mind the
different time periods at which the issues may arise or be resolved.
Various issues will be encountered at the time testator plans his
10 Cf. Brodrick v. Moore, 226 F.2d 105 (10th Cir. 1955) (contention of ad-
vancement made for purpose of increasing amount passing to widow and
qualifying for marital deduction).
11 See Casner, Estate Planning Cases, Statutes, Text and Other Materials
87-106 (2d ed. 1956). Also see, Brake, Selecting The Distributive Mediums
In Estate Planning, 35 Mich. St. Bar J. (No. 2) 17 (Feb. 1956).
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estate, when the executor takes over the administration, during
administration, at the time of final accounting or distribution, and
possibly even after the formal probate administration is completed.
Especially in attempting to provide a workable solution to the
income taxation of probate estates, it is important to consider the
appropriate time periods in the transmission of property through
the estate toward which the income tax provisions should be
focused.
1. Application of the Estate and Trust Income Tax Allocation
Provisions.
(a) Property Included In or Excluded From an Income Tax
"Estate."
The general income tax provisions relating to individuals also
apply to " . . . the taxable income of estates or of any kind of
property held in trust, including-(1) . . . income accumulated or
held for future distribution under the terms of the will or trust,
... [and] (3) income received by estates of deceased persons dur-
ing the period of administration or settlement of the estate ... -11
There is a critical divergence in the underlying analysis of the
general scope of this provision. It is possible to view the statute as
taxing any income coming into the possession and control of the
executor, regardless of its source. 13 It is equally possible to reason
that the statute taxes only that income which the executor controls
in a fiduciary capacity; if the executor does not have some sort
of a "trust" over the property, he is not accountable for the income
tax on it.
14
12 I.R.C. § 641 (a).
13 See Kennedy, Federal Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates 497, 499-
503 (1948).
14Estate income tax returns are required to be "... made by the fiduciary
thereof." I.R.C. § 6012 (b) (4). Fiduciary ". . . means a guardian, trustee,
executor, administrator, -receiver, conservator, or any person acting in any
fiduciary capacity for any person." I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (6). Note that a "duly
authorized agent" may make the return for a person under a disability.
I.R.C. § 6012 (b) (2). Also, "fiduciary" is not employed in the requirement
for decedent's final return. I.R.C. § 6012 (b) (1). Personal liability for tax
payments may be applied to "fiduciaries". I.R.C. § 6901 et seq. But these
provisions do not necessarily mean that where there is a fiduciary relation-
ship, the estate does not include property which is not technically held in
such a capacity. Where there is no fiduciary relationship, the courts will
not regard the property as falling under the estate provisions. See United
States v. Cooke, 228 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1955) (2-1 decision) (legal life tenant
with power of sale not taxable on gain, either individually or as fiduciary);
Prudence Miller Trust, 7 T.C. 1245 (1946) (statute not applicable to con-
structive trust).
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For example, under the general common law rule that the
title to real estate vests immediately in the heirs or devisees, it
has been held that the heirs or devisees, not the executor, are tax-
able for rents 15 and gains and losses16 earned during the period of
administration. However, applying state property law, a testa-
mentary direction that the executor hold and manage the real
estate until it can be sold advantageously and then distribute the
proceeds could put the property into the "estate";17 but a precari-
ous line might be drawn under the property law of the same state
to exclude a "mere power of sale" without a power of manage-
ment, if, technically, the heirs and not the executor have the fee
title.'8 An executor exercising a power of management over real
property for an extended period of time would not be subject to
the estate income tax on rents or on gains from the sale of the
property if he is held to have acted only as an "agent" and not as a
"fiduciary."'19 But, with respect to the law of some states in which
title vests immediately in the devisees, income has been held tax-
able to the estate on the basis that the executor had possession and
control, since the beneficiary, though having a fee title, did not
have an immediate right to possession. 20
15 See, e.g., George L. Craig, 7 B.T.A. 504 (1927); Guaranty Trust Co., 30
B.T.A. 314 (1934). Also see Michaelson, Income Taxation of Estates and
Trusts 5 n.16 (1955).
16 See, e.g., Radin v. Commissioner, 33 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1929) (intestate
property).
17 Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20 (1933) (losses; beneficiaries have no
fee interest in land, merely a right to proceeds); Commissioner v. Brincker-
hoff, 168 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1948); Gamble v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 694
(E.D. Mo. 1953); See G.C.M. 12771, XIII-1 Cum. Bull. 148 (1934); also see
Clarence Strecker, 6 B.T.A. 19 (1927).
18 See Weber v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1940) (direction to
sell and distribute proceeds, but no power of management, held under N.Y.
law to be power in trust and not fee title); Sam S. Brown, 20 T.C. 73 (1953)
(power held exercisable, as a matter of intent, only if other assets insuf-
ficient to pay debts); also see note 19 infra.
19 Arrott v. Heiner, 92 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1937) (executor managed building
for 22 years as "agent," then sold and distributed the proceeds, held not "in
trust"); James W. Arrott, Jr., 23 B.T.A. 478 (1931) (same transaction, dif-
ferent parties). But cf. S.M. 4945, V-1 Cum. Bull. 68 (1926).
2 0 Estate of Zellerbach, 9 T.C. 89 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 169. F.2d 275
(9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 903 (1949); Estate of Cohen, 8 T.C. 784
(1947); Estate of McBirney, 11 P-H 1942 B.T.A. & T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 42,360.
By analogy, the corporate constructive ownership of stock rules are applica-
ble with respect to property subject to administration, whether or not it
vests immediately in the heirs. Reg. § 1.318-3(a).
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In those jurisdictions enacting the civil law rule that personal
property also vests immediately in the next of kin, it has been
held that income from personalty is taxable to the estate during
administration, 21 but there is some thinking to the contrary.
22 It
is now settled that only one-half of community property income,
even personal property community income, is taxable to decedent's
estate.23 Previously, there was considerable authority that under
state laws which subjected the entire community property to ad-
ministration, the estate was taxable on the entire income, includ-
ing the one-half over which the surviving spouse retained title.
24
Nonprobate property is generally outside of the scope of the income
tax estate.
This gap in conceptual thinking as to just what property is
included in an estate will provide a certain vaguely defined area in
which, as a practical matter, there may be an allocation based
upon income tax consequences. These rules should be a factor in
testator's planning the distributive media of his estate plan.25 In
addition, they provide a device whereby a nimble executor may
21 Jones v. Whittington, 194 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1952); Kuldell v. Commis-
sioner, 69 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1934); Estate of McBirney, 11 P-H 1942 B.T.A. &
T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 42,360; Estate of Zellerbach, 9 T.C. 89 (1947), affd per
curiam, 169 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 903 (1949); Estate
of Cohen, 8 T.C. 784 (1947).
22 See Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Donnelly, 121 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. La.), aff'd
per curiam, 214 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1954) (vesting statute, plus demand by
legatees; but the Louisiana Civil Code on settlement of decedents' estates
varies significantly from the laws of other states); Jones v. Whittington,
96 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Okla. 1951), rev'd, 194 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1952)
(2-1 decision).
2 3 Rev. Rul. 55-726, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 24; Sneed v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d
313 (5th Cir. 1955) (2-1 decision); United States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th
Cir. 1954); Blackburn's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1950);
Henderson's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1946); Bishop v.
Commissioner, 152 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1945); Estate of Woodward, 24 T.C. 883
(1955), aff'd on other grounds sub nom, Barnhill v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d
496 (5th Cir. 1957); see Note, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 296 (1956). Even where the
surviving spouse waived her community property right, only one-half of
the property was included in the estate for income tax purposes. Wells Fargo
Bank v. United States, 245 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1957) (2-1 decision), reversing
134 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Cal. 1955). In some cases, these rules may discriminate
against the non-community property states.
24 Barbour v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1937) (community prop-
erty stocks); Commissioner v. Larson, 131 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1942), affirming
44 B.T.A. 1094 (1941).
25 See, generally, Friedman and Michaelson, How To Plan For The Income
Of An Estate, Lasser's Estate Tax Techniques 1541, 1566-7 (1955).
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act at the inception of his appointment to include or exclude prop-
erty from the probate estate depending upon the income tax con-
sequences. For the most part, this will only be to minimize the
taxes of nonadverse interests; for example, to drag property into
the estate and temporarily relieve it from higher brackets of the
ultimate beneficiary, or to forsake custody by the estate in favor
of a lower bracket beneficiary. But this sort of action could involve
adverse interests beyond merely shifting the property from the
nonprobate income tax group (GROUP 2) to the probate income
tax group (GROUP 1). Once within the probate estate, the in-
come becomes subject to allocation under the estate and trust in-
come allocation rules, to the interaction of income tax with estate
tax, and, perhaps, more subject to claims of the surviving spouse or
creditors. Also, if only the probate estate contributes to the estate
tax, then the recipients' interests would be converted from non-
taxable interests passing through the gross estate (GROUP 5) to
an estate tax contributing group (GROUP 3), by now being within
the probate estate. Thus, although the gap may not be tremen-
dously large on this one item alone, the stakes are quite high in
that it may shift property outside of the entire scope of the estate
income tax scheme, bring into the estate property which would
otherwise not be a part of the probate estate for income tax pur-
poses, and involve additional tax and other financial considerations.
(b) Distributions.
Historically, the estate has always been viewed as of the same
fiber as a trust for purposes of an income tax allocation mechan-
ism. 26 When the 1954 Code established a new pattern of beneficiary
inclusion and estate distribution deduction, the failure to differ-
entiate between the methods of operation of an estate and a trust
created a number of serious problems in the income taxation of
probate estates.
In many respects an estate and a trust are similar. Both are
managed by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity in whom title
26 The first effective federal income tax in 1862, the ill-fated Act of 1894,
and the Revenue Act of 1913 each specifically recognized an obligation of
the probate representative to file an income tax return, but the first sub-
stantive provisions dealing with trusts and estates were contained in the
Revenue Act of 1916. The Revenue Act of 1918 put the general applicability
provisions into virtually their present form, and the Revenue Act of 1924
set up the estate and trust distribution deduction and beneficiary inclusion
pattern which, as modified in 1942, carried through substantially until
changed by the 1954 Code. For practical purposes, the underlying tax alloca-
tion mechanism was the same for trusts and estates. See Int. Rev. Code of
1939, §§ 161-162, 53 Stat. 66-67 (1939), as amended, 56 Stat. 809-810 (1942).
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to the personal property is vested, and both have an element of
judicial supervision.2 7 But the fundamental reason for the existence
of an estate is different from that of a trust. The trust is a device
for holding property for some period of time, with the trustee per-
forming whatever duties and making whatever distributions may
be called for during that period.28 The function of a probate ad-
ministration is to gather decedent's property, settle his accounts,
pay taxes, and distribute the property as expeditiously as possible.29
A one year period is the hoped for time necesary to complete the
administration under many state laws.30 An effect of the federal
estate tax may have been to extend somewhat the normal time
necessary to complete an administration, but the duty of the ex-
ecutor is still to make distributions as rapidly as possible under
the circumstances, whereas the trustee counterpart has a primary
duty of acting over a period of time.
Under prior statutes, only that amount of income distributed
or currently distributable by an estate was taxable to the bene-
ficiaries.31 The essential test was one of tracing the payment to its
source. If the source of the distribution was income, then the
beneficiary might be taxable; but if the source was corpus, the
beneficiary was not taxed on the distribution, and any income
remained taxable to the estate.32
The 1954 Code established the concept of distributable net
income. Under these rules, any amounts paid, credited, or required
to be distributed to the beneficiaries, other than bequests of spe-
cific sums of money or of specific property,33 are considered as
being from the income of the estate to the extent of the "dis-
tributable net income" of the estate for that year.34 The income
is applied under a two tier system of priority: (i) first tier, the
amount of income required to be distributed currently (whether
actually distributed or not), (ii) second tier, all other amounts prop-
27 1 Scott, Trusts 55 (1956).
28 Restatement, Trusts § 2 (1935).
29 See 1 Scott, Trusts 56-7 (1956).
30 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-1409 (Reissue 1956).
31 See, generally, Kennedy, Federal Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates
§ 5.17 (1948).
32 See Kamin, Surrey, and Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1237, 1246-8 (1954).
33 I.R.C. § 663 (a) (1).
34 I.R.C. § 662 (a).
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erly paid, credited, or required to be distributed to the beneficiaries.
Within each tier, the individual recipients are treated equally on
a pro rata basis as to the inclusion amount and character of the in-
come, unless the testator has allocated different classes of income
to different beneficiaries.3 5 The same total beneficiary inclusion
figure serves as a distribution deduction in the estate's income tax
return for that year, thus attempting to make the estate a mere
conduit through which the income passes.36
This pattern applies whether the distribution is actually paid
out of income or corpus, and covers estates and trusts in the same
over-all manner. It means that even if a beneficiary receives solely
a corpus distribution, he may be subject to an income tax to the
extent of the estate's distributable net income for that year. As
defined in the statute, "distributable net income" is a modified
version of taxable income,3 7 the most important difference being
that capital gains are not included to the extent they are allocated
to corpus and are not paid, credited, or required to be distributed
during the taxable year.38
So long as the old codes simply sought out the person to whom
the income items could be traced, there appeared to be no critical
reason for treating a probate estate differently than a trust. There
were extreme difficulties in attempting to apply the rules for de-
termining the person considered to have actually received the
income,3 9 but the effort was one to tax the beneficiary upon receipt
of a current income item whether it passed through an estate or
trust.
In putting its emphasis on distributions, whether income or
corpus, the 1954 Code has placed its force in the direction of the
primary distinguishing feature between the estate and the trust-
that of the timing and nature of its distributions. The estate has a
main objective of speedy disposition of the decedent's property; a
trust is a device used to achieve a holding or distribution of prop-
erty over a period of time. It appears that the method of operation
35 I.R.C. § 662 (b).
386 I.R.C. § 661 (a). In fact, the income would not be includable by the bene-
ficiary unless it was deductible by the estate. See I.R.C. § 662 (a) (first
sentence).
37 I.R.C. § 643 (a).
38 I.R.C. § 643 (a) (3). See discussion pages 346-347.
39 See note 32 supra.
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of trusts was the main type of situation which was contemplated
by the present code provisions.40 There are many aspects of trust
administration which the distributable net income concept will
handle effectively, but this mechanism seems much less appropri-
at-e when applied to the normal probate administration. When
applied to estates, the distribution mechanism creates serious in-
equities among the various individuals interested in the estate.
The writers have been quick to point to a number of the weak-
nesses in the present distributable net income scheme for taxing
the income of estates.41 For the most part, the problems appear
to be the result of a failure to tailor a distribution system to fit the
precise operation of an estate, although some result from imper-
fections which have not yet been ironed out of the basic distribu-
tion scheme, itself.
(1) General Operation of the Rules. It is pointed out that if
son A is poor and son B is wealthy, and if the executor makes a
partial distribution to aid the poor son during administration, he
may also be passing off the burden of the estate's entire income
tax for that year to the poor son, thereby relieving the wealthy
son of paying his share of the year's income tax. Or, if the executor
distributes $90,000 in corpus to X and $10,000, the estate's taxable
and distributable net income for the year, to Y, X may pay an in-
come tax on 9/10ths of the year's income ($9,000) and Y on only
1/10th ($1,000). It has been alleged that the income tax resulting
to A or X on distributions of corpus is actually an unconstitutional
40 The pre-1954 American Law Institute Drafts which formed the working
nucleus for the 1954 Code provisions were designed for trust operation and
were only optionally available to estates. See Holland, Kennedy, Surrey
and Warren, A Proposed Revision Of The Federal Income Tax Treatment of
Trusts and Estates - American Law Institute Draft, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 316,
354-8 (1953). Congress did not employ the proposed estate method of the ALI,
changed the tier system somewhat, and did not provide a special distribution
treatment for estates. The committee reports are couched generally in terms
of "trusts or estates" and "trusts", and do not contain specific reference to
or examples of estate distribution operations.
41 See Falsey, Income Tax Planning (And Pitfalls) In The Administration
of Decedents' Estates, 30 Conn. Bar. J. 260, 264 et seq. (1956); Ofsthun,
Income Tax Saving Techniques Available to An Executor, 44 Ill. Bar J. 588,
592 et seq. (1956); Fillman, Selections From Subchapter J, 10 Tax L. Rev.
453, 470-1 (1955); Alexander, Two Current Income Tax Problems of Ex-
ecutors, 29 Ohio Bar Ass'n Rep. 752, 759 (1956). Also see ALI Fed. Income,
Estate and Gift Tax Stat. 147 et seq. (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1956).
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capital levy,42 and perhaps it might be argued that this uncon-
stitutionally bases one person's tax on another person's income,43
but these contentions may be overstating the inequity in the light
of current attitudes concerning realization. However, in two recent
cases 44 discussed below, the state probate courts have simply re-
fused to apply the distributable net income concept in settling the
executors' accounts, insofar as one beneficiary had benefitted at
the expense of the other. The courts reasoned that the income tax
rules are for payment of a tax to the federal government and not
for readjustment of the rights of the parties. But, in these cases
only the detriment to the losing beneficiary had to be repaid by
the benefiting beneficiary; there was no further requirement that
the net tax savings be shared by all beneficiaries.4 5
(2) Corpus Deductions. Distributable net income is computed
with all tax deductions, including those deductions relating to cor-
pus, even though corresponding capital gains may not be included.
This consequence was designed to prevent a wasting of corpus de-
ductions which might not otherwise be of use to the executor.40
It means, in effect, that where distributions are made, the income
beneficiaries are given the tax use of corpus expenses and the
remaindermen pay a higher tax. The distributable net income as an
income computation is understated and the net corpus gain is over-
stated. This has been severely criticised as favoring income bene-
ficiaries of a trust (distributee beneficiaries of an estate) over the
corpus beneficiaries. 47 The problem is discussed in more detail
below in connection with the extremely complex elective deduction
problems which arise in the case of estates, since most estate ex-
42 See, e.g., Craven, Taxation of Estate and Trust Income Under the 1954
Code, 103 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 602, 613-4 (1955); statement of Harrison Tweed,
Hearings on Technical Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
348-9, 352-3 (1956).
43 See Hoepfer v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931) (state tax statute);
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 683 (1933) (5-4 decision) (dissenting opinion).
But cf. Muriel Dodge Neeman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956).
44 Estate of Levy, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957); Estate of Rice, 8 Pa.
D. & C. 2d 379, 410-417 (Orph. Ct. 1956).
45 No case has yet required net tax savings to be shared by all bene-
ficiaries. See discussion pages 360-361 below.
46 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 346 (1954).
47 See Revised First Report on Estates, Trusts, Beneficiaries, and De-
cedents, Received By The House Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxa-
tion 17-20 (Nov. 22, 1957).
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penses are payable out of corpus and also have an elective use as
deductions for estate tax purposes.48
(3) Impediments in Conduit. The use of corpus expenses ac-
centuates another type of problem, also not peculiar to estates,
which creates an impediment in the attempted conduit through
the estate. Since an estate nets the figures to be included in the
beneficiary's return,49 rather than simply passing on uncombined
classes of all items of income and deduction as in the case of partner-
ships,50 the netting out of income items may also have the effect of
reducing the value of the dividends received credit, capital gains
deduction, or alternative tax on capital gains available to the dis-
tributee beneficiaries.51 Also, the noninclusion of certain types of
exempt income in- distributable net income could deprive a bene-
ficiary of their favorable character in some circumstances.
2
(4) Distributions to Spouses. 53 It is possible that an ex-wife
receiving periodic alimony or separate maintenance payments may
escape the income tax which she would otherwise pay, by being
48 See pages 355-360 below.
49 I.R.C. § 662 (b) (items of deduction shall be allocated among the items of
distributable net income as prescribed by the Secretary). See Reg. H3 1.662
(c)-4(e), 1.652(b)-3. A proportionate amount of the expenses must be allo-
cated to tax exempt items; the remainder may be apportioned as the ex-
ecutor selects.
50 I.R.C. § 702.
51 See ALI Fed. Income, Est. and Gift Tax Stat. 96-7, 133-9, 142-4 (Tent.
Draft No. 11, 1956). The amount of deduction unavailable to the beneficiaries
apparently inures to the estate.
52 Id. at 131-2.
53 The problem of widow support payments has been substantially clarified
by Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(e) which treats such payments as being under the tier
system only to the extent payable out of and chargeable to income under the
order or decree or local law. The proposed regulations had treated widows'
allowances as distributions under the tier system, which could have sub-
jected the widow to adverse income tax consequences. See Prop. Reg. H§
1.661(a)-2(c), 1.662(a)-3(a)(4), 1.663(a)-l(b)(5) (1956); cf. Prop. Reg. § 1.642
(h)-l(c)(1) (1956) (denying carryovers on termination). In addition to dis-
tributions, there are a number of possible income tax savings which the
executor may undertake with a surviving spouse. The executor may elect
to file a joint return with the surviving spouse for decedent's final tax year.
I.R.C. § 6013 (a) (3). In fact, he may be under a duty to do so. See Floyd
Estate (No. 2), 76 Pa. D. & C. 597 (Orph. Ct. 1951). Although the estate is
jointly and severally liable for the full income tax, only the proportionate
amount is deductible for estate tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 56-290, 1956-1 Cum.
Bull. 445; cf. Rev. Rul. 55-334, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 449 (entire joint gift tax
deductible; quaere whether executor must insist on contribution). The ex-
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considered as a beneficiary of the estate.54 Also, the vexing problems
of the double unknown may be reintroduced into formula marital
deduction clauses. Since the formula bequests will not generally
come within the specific bequest exclusion, 55 the spouse might be
required to pay an income tax because of the amounts received,
and the valuation of the interest passing to the spouse which can
qualify for the marital deduction be reduced therefor.50
(5) Trusts as Beneficiaries. A trust may be a beneficiary of
the probate estate, and considered as a separate entity for income
tax purposes.57 It has, therefore, been suggested that distributions
be made during the years of probate administration to the trusts
ecutor should negotiate a suitable apportionment of the net tax savings
with the spouse, and insure that the spouse pays her share. Cf. Kennedy,
Income Tax Problems of Decedents and Their Estates, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 36,
40 (1953) (indicating that the larger corporate executors in Chicago do not
regard the risk as large enough to warrant application to the probate court,
even where the will has no specific enabling clause). Expenses for medical
care of decedent paid by the estate within one year after death are deductible
either in decedent's income tax return or in the estate tax return, at the
election of the executor. I.R.C. § 213 (d), 2053. In some circumstances, a
widow's renunciation, waiver, disclaimer, or statutory election could have
significant income tax consequences.
54 Generally, periodic alimony or separate maintenance payments are
includable in full by the wife and deductible by the husband. I.R.C. H3 71,
215. A wife receiving payments from an estate is a beneficiary of the estate.
I.R.C. § 682 (b). The estate is entitled to a distribution deduction for the
alimony payments, but may not take the alimony deduction of I.R.C. § 215.
See note 102, infra. As a distribution deduction, the amount is limited by
distributable net income. Under the 1939 Code, the Commissioner took the
position that periodic payments must be included in the wife's income in full,
whether deductible by the estate or not. G.C.M. 25999, 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 116.
See Albert R. Gallatin Welsh Trust, 16 T.C. 1398, 1400-1 (1951), aff'd per
curiam sub nom, Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Commissioner, 194
F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952); Muriel Dodge
Neeman, 26 T.C. 864 (1956). Under the 1954 Code, the distributable net
income of the estate is also the beneficiary's inclusion maximum. In a year
when the estate distributes more than the amount of its distributable net
income, does I.R.C. § 71 conflict with § 682 (b) and 662 (a)? Would the
wife receive the benefit of a favorable character of the estate's income?
See Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947).
55 See Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(1), 1.663(a)-l(b)(2)(iii).
56 See I.R.C. § 2056 (b) (4) (B). Cf. I.R.C. § 2056 (b) (4) (A). Note that not
only may the marital deduction double unknown result from the income tax
"encumbrance," but the encumbrance itself depends upon the spouse's in-
dividual income tax bracket.
57 Reg. § 1.643(c)-i. See G.C.M. 24749, 1945 Cum. Bull. 237; Rev. Rul. 57-31,
1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 4, at 6.
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involved in the estate in order to split the income among a number
of taxpayers. But suppose that testator's bequest to a testamentary
trust is of a corpus amount which will not qualify for the specific
bequest exclusion, and that X is the life beneficiary and Y the
remainderman of the trust. If the executor distributes $10,000 to
the trust, this amount would constitute trust corpus under normal
trust accounting rules, but under the distributable net income con-
cept, the trust may be required to pay an income tax of $2,500 (tax
on $10,000 taxable income). Thus, the corpus may be reduced from
$10,000 to $7,500; possibly, X may be called upon to replenish a por-
tion of the income tax out of future earnings; and, in any event, the
future earning power of the trust will be diminished. The rest of
the probate estate has benefited by paying a lower income tax.
Stated in this fashion, it would seem that the executor might be in
danger in making this distribution. On the other hand, an executor
may be surcharged for delaying administration unreasonably. This
situation with respect to the residuary trust is only a specialized ap-
plication of the general distribution issue, but it is highlighted be-
cause of the apparent intrusion upon trust accounting concepts. 58
(6) Basis Adjustment-and Distribution of Appreciated Prop-
erty. As a phase of the payment of an income tax by a beneficiary
receiving a corpus distribution, it should be noted that the dis-
tributee beneficiary may not receive an increase in the basis of
the distributed property for the taxes paid. Assume that property
held by decedent at death and having a then value of $1,000 has
since increased in value to $1,200, but that in the interests of the
over-all estate the optional valuation date is not elected. The prop-
erty is distributed to B in a year of administration for which the
value of the total distributions does not equal distributable net
income of the estate, and the distribution is not in satisfaction of
a specific bequest. B may be required to include in his individual
return $1,200 of the estate's income for the year of distribution.59
Normally, the basis of property received "as income" becomes the
value at which it is taken into account for income tax purposes.60
But here, the income tax inclusion value is presumably applied to
establish a basis for the property received by the estate as income,
since it is not the distribution which is income, but the receipt by
58See Falsey, Distribution By Estate To Residuary Trust, 96 Trusts and
Estates 405 (1957).
59 This assumes the most unfavorable application of the distributable net
income rules.
60 See, e.g., Maurice P. O'Meara, 8 T.C. 622, 633 (1947).
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the estate.61 The basis for B's property may remain at $1,000 under
the normal basis of inherited property rule,62 and upon a sale at
$1,200, B may have an additional gain of $200. B may end up with
$1,200 taxable income and $200 gain before his ultimate disposition
of the asset, which originally was a bequest having a value of $1,000
at death. B may or may not receive some of the estate income for
the year involved (with or without further income tax con-
sequences), depending upon the governing instrument and applic-
able state law.
The inequity in this example has been increased by the fact
that it also involves appreciated property, but apart from the double
income feature, comparable basis problems exist even where there
has been no appreciation. The primary issue is whether the basis
of property acquired from a decedent is adjusted where the estate
income distribution rules require an amount to be included as in-
come to the distributee.
Perhaps this example is not correct and B would actually have
a basis of $1,200 for the property since he has taken that figure into
income-the inclusion in income rule prevailing over the basis of
bequest rule. But, if so, even more serious problems may result:
(i) What is the basis for the property received by the estate which
gave rise to the income? If given its full value, then there has been
a double tax basis secured from a single income tax. If not, the
administrative problems may be impossible. (ii) What would B's
basis for the distributed property have been if under the dis-
tributable net income rules he had included only $300 in individual
income as a result of the distribution? Similar double basis and
administrative difficulties would be present.
(7) Termination Distributions. Problems arising in termination
distributions are discussed in a subsequent portion of this paper
which deals with timing the duration and termination of the estate,
and allocation of income, losses, and deductions upon termination.
63
(8) Capital Gains. Capital gains are taxable to the estate (and
are not a part of distributable net income) to the extent they are
61 The distribution of a bequest to the beneficiary should not be confused
with the satisfaction of a legacy with appreciated property, note 80 infra.
The latter gives rise to income realization by the estate and the property
acquires an increased basis in that transaction. Normally, the receipt of a
bequest does not give rise to income to the beneficiary. I.R.C. § 102.
62 I.R.C. § 1014. By hypothesis, property retained by the estate has acquired
the $1,200 basis represented by B's inclusion in income.
63 Pages 351-353 below.
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allocated to corpus under the terms of the governing instrument
and applicable state law, and are not paid, credited, or required to
be distributed to a beneficiary during the taxable year.64 Where
not so allocated to corpus, capital gains are a part of distributable
net income and may be deductible by the estate and includable
by the beneficiaries. This may operate (i) to influence planning
by the testator, (ii) as a means for the.executor to pass additional
income from the estate to the beneficiaries, the main condition being
that the executor trace the capital gain to distribution rather than
retention,63 (iii) as a possible means of watering down distributions
not substantially in excess of distributable net income, as computed
without capital gains, with a capital gain element,6 or (iv) in
determining the type of assets to be sold where the estate needs
more liquid assets and will be making some distributions.7 The
individual beneficiaries in the estate may have differing attitudes.
The high income tax bracket beneficiary will desire to take any
capital gains personally and have the income items taxed to the
estate. The low bracket beneficiary might prefer to take the income
items as an individual and have capital gains, if anything,68 taxable
to the estate. This analysis is by no means comprehensive of the
problems involved, but is merely designed to point to the treat-
ment of capital gains as another complicating factor in the present
distributable net income provisions where adverse interests are
involved in the estate.
(9) Required To Be Distributed Currently; Credited or Re-
quired To Be Distributed. In addition to completed distributions,
the inclusion of income by a beneficiary and the distribution deduc-
tion available to the estate are based upon: (i) in the first tier,
amounts of income for the taxable year required to be distributed
64 I.R.C. § 643 (a) (3).
65 See Kamin, Surrey, and Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954:
Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1237, 1241-2 (1954).
66 But it is not clear how the computations are to be made in a year when
there is both a capital gain and a corpus distribution. See ALI Fed. Income,
Estate and Gift Tax Stat. 103-4 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1956).
67 In addition to the character of the realization, capital gains are more
readily tax retainable by the estate and ordinary income more likely to be
taxed to the individual.
68 The beneficiary might desire that neither his share of income nor gains
be taxed to the estate. But, he would prefer gain over income since the
value of the capital gains deduction would be greater at the estate's effective
tax rate, or the alternative capital gains tax might be available. This as-
sumes that the individual beneficiary would, in no event, be charged for
the tax or taxed on more than his own share of the income and gains.
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currently, whether distributed or not, and (ii) in the second tier,
any other amount properly credited or required to be distributed.69
In the case of a probate estate, it seems doubtful whether any act
short of a court order for payment can constitute "required to be
distributed currently," 70 and probably not even "credited or re-
quired to be distributed."7 1 It would appear that the testator may
be effectively deprived of the opportunity of his intervivos settlor
counterpart to utilize the first tier as a means of income tax alloca-
tion, and, to a degree, the ability to allocate different classes of in-
come to different beneficiaries. In fact, unless the estate is in a
position to make an actual distribution during the taxable year, it
may not be able to apportion that year's taxes under the distribut-
able net income system (and, similarly, it may not face many of
the distribution problems discussed in this section). Apart from
these tax rules, the phrases "required to be distributed currently"
and "credited or required to be distributed" do not appear to have
a significant meaning in normal estate administration.
69 I.R.C. § 661 (a), 662 (a).
70 See Horace Greeley Hill, Jr., 24 T.C. 1133 (1955) (power of executor to
require refunding bond). As additionally noted in the concurring opinion,
Id. at 1140, legatees would normally have no presently enforceable rights
in estate income, even though the will is construed to state the contrary,
since the income is generally liable for debts and taxes, and payment is
subject to the executor's and probate court's consent. The authorities cited
in note 71 infra dealing with the phrase "required to be distributed" would
apply a fortiori to "required to be distributed currently." Cf. Commissioner
v. Stearns, 65 F.2d 371, 373 (2d Cir. 1933) (The phrase ". . . presupposes a
periodic duty of the trustee, and possibly in rare cases of an executor.") An
estate would not be treated as a simple trust even if all its income were
"required to be distributed currently." I.R.C. § 651; Reg. § 1.651(a)(5).
71 Estate of Zellerbach, 9 T.C. 89 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 169 F.2d 275 (9th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 903 (1949) (present right upon petition to
probate court insufficient, even with testimony of probate judge that ap-
proval would have been granted); Estate of Cohen, 8 T.C. 784 (1947). But
note that these cases also based taxability to the estate upon executor's
possession when technical title was in the heirs. Commissioner v. Stearns,
65 F.2d 371, 373 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand: "The income must be so definitely
allocated to the legatee as to be beyond recall; 'credit' for practical purposes
is the equivalent of 'payment.' Therefore, a mere entry on the books of the
fiduciary will not serve unless made in such circumstances that it cannot
be recalled.") For valid procedures with respect to crediting, involving pro-
bate orders, see Estate of Fossett, 21 T.C. 874 (1954) (ordinary income and
capital gain); Estate of Igoe, 6 T.C. 639 (1946). Cf. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v.
Donnelly, 121 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. La.),affd per curiam, 214 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.
1954) (under La. statute only demand for payment was necessary; income
taxed to beneficiary from time of demand); Foellinger v. Smith, 41-2 U.S.T.C.
J 9579 (N.D. Ind. 1941) (". . . property credited within the taxable year and
so credited that each of the plaintiffs was presently entitled thereto . . .").
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(10) Charitable Distributions. An estate is allowed a deduction
for amounts of the current year's income, or apparently of accumu-
lated income,7 2 which are paid or permanently set aside for chari-
table purposes pursuant to the governing instrument.7 3 To obtain
the deduction, the executor must trace the income item to the
charitable purpose (or the charitable distribution to income).71
The charitable deduction, itself, ranks as a middle tier in the tier
system, being computed after the first tier (required current in-
come distributions) for first tier purposes,75 but ahead of the second
tier (other distributions) for second tier purposes.76 These com-
putations may cause difficulties for the executor, but serious prob-
lems with respect to conflicting interests do not appear to be in-
volved. And, although the first tier may be somewhat useless to
an estate, the peg of the charitable middle tier is merely "paid or
permanently set aside" for charitable purposes and this may be a
more usable standard for estate operation.
(c) Timing Administration Activities.
(1) Administration Generally. In carrying out his fiduciary
functions, the executor must tread lightly so that his actions will
be properly timed to result in a minimum federal income tax. The
problems faced by the executor in arranging for the income taxa-
tion of the estate would, by themselves, seem to constitute a sub-
stantial impediment in the normal probate administration.
The distribution problems, discussed above, w e r e primarily
problems of timing the distributions to beneficiaries. But the time
at which income is realized, the character of the realization, the
presence of losses or deductions, and many other factors will, in
large part, determine the income tax significance of the distribu-
tions. In turn, the realization aspects are determined in part by
another set of choices. As a new taxpayer, an estate is entitled to
elect to report its income on a calendar year basis or on a fiscal
year basis ending on the last day of any month77 and to adopt a
72 Cf. I.R.C. §§ 642 (c), 662 (b). See Surrey and Warren, Federal Income
Taxation 762 (1955); S. Rep. No.1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 350 (1954).
73 I.R.C. § 642 (c).
74 See ALI Fed. Income, Est. and Gift Tax Stat. 108 (Tent. Draft No. 11,
1956).
75 I.R.C. § 662 (a) (1), 662 (b).
76 I.R.C. H9 662 (a) (2), 662 (b), 643 (a) (last paragraph).
77 See I.R.C. § 441; Falsey, Income Tax Planning (And Pitfalls) In The
Administration of Decedents' Estates, 30 Conn. Bar J. 260-3 (1956).
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cash or accrual method of accounting.7 8 Some decisions will require
the executor to weigh an income tax advantage with an estate tax
advantage and make a selection involving both substance and
timing.79 And many other choices are present as to whether the
income is realized by the estate or by an individual; in addition to
the leeway in inclusion of property in the probate estate, the
executor faces such problems as the satisfaction of legacies with
appreciated property,8 0 reinvestment of casualty loss proceeds,81
and the redemption of stock to pay death taxes.8 2
These duties are only a portion of the executor's income tax
duties, the income tax duties only a portion of the executor's general
tax duties, and, of course, the tax duties are, themselves, only a
portion of the executor's total duties. Of primary importance to
the executor is his responsibility for an efficient management of
the property of the decedent. While each possible intrusion upon
the administration might, in itself, be workable, it would seem that
the sum total of all the added income tax considerations demanding
a conscious tax timing of the administration duties would be over-
whelming. Not only is the executor put in the position of having to
solve in duplicate or triplicate each estate problem, but the probate
court is called upon for added actions which in many respects
require a redesigning of the state probate operation to fit a desired
federal income tax consequence. The important decisions in property
management during administration take on an omnipresent color-
ing of federal income tax implications. Since the executor may have
78 See I.R.C. § 446. The cash method would normally be selected, but an
accrual method could operate to spread administration expenses over the
life of the estate, or to bring into the estate real property taxes which are
assessed but not paid during the administration period, etc.
79 See pages 355-356 below.
80 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 325 (satisfaction of marital
deduction formula bequest); Kenan, Jr. v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d
Cir. 1940); Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd per
curiam, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1936). Cf. Rev. Rul.
55-117, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 233 (partial distribution does not involve sale or
exchange). One tax savings opportunity is to trade a capital gain to the
estate for subsequent beneficiary ordinary deductions. Also see Alexander,
Two Current Income Tax Problems of Executors, 29 Ohio St. Bar Ass'n Rep.
752 (1956).
81 I.R.C. § 1033.
82 I.R.C. § 303. See Dean and Leake, How To Redeem Stock Under Section
303 To Pay Death Taxes Plus Funeral And Administration Expenses,
Lasser's Estate Tax Techniques 1509 (1955).
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extensive duties of administration to perform within a limited time,
the present problems of income tax timing would appear to place
an undue barrier in the normal probate administration.
(2) Duration and Termination of the Estate. The probate estate
has an income tax existence during the period of time actually
required by the executor to perform his duties of administration and
settlement of the estate.8 3 The termination distribution will result
in the beneficiaries being taxed on the estate income for its last year
(including capital gains) under the rules of distributable net in-
come. The 1954 Code added a provision which permits net operating
losses, capital losses and deductions unused by the estate in its last
return to be carried over to the beneficiaries upon termination.8 4
There are three basic ways in which the executor may achieve tax
savings with respect to timing the duration and termination of the
estate: (i) by extending or reducing the over-all period of admin-
istration, (ii) by regulating the flow of income to the beneficiaries
upon termination, and (iii) by regulating the flow of losses and
deductions to the beneficiaries upon termination.
(i) Length of Administration. An estate will normally terminate
for income tax purposes at the time of its final distribution to the
beneficiaries.8 5 It will also be deemed terminated after the expira-
tion of a reasonable period for the performance by the executor
of all the duties of administration.8 6 After that time, the persons
succeeding to the estate property become liable for the income tax
on estate income, although no particular method of making such an
allocation is provided.8 7 Within the limits of reasonableness, the
executor is free to determine whether the estate exists for two,
three, or four fiscal years; beyond this, there may be some question,
but the executor may be able to show a good reason for continuing
the estate as such, and, if so, the estate will continue to exist for
83 Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a). See Fillman, Upon The Termination Of Trusts And
Estates, 8 Tax L. Rev. 317, 320 (1953).
841.R.C. § 642 (1h).
8 5 But, action of the probate court in closing the administration and dis-
charging the executor is not conclusive on termination for federal income
tax purposes. See Ralph E. Hedges, 18 T.C. 681 (1952) (4 judges dissenting),
aff'd per curiam, 212 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1954) (discharge due to fraudulent
conduct of executor).
86 Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a).
87 See Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(d).
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income tax purposes.8 8 Furthermore, apart from such action as the
distribution of substantially all of the estate corpus, 9 the rules of
reasonableness would not appear designed to pick out that specific
portion of a year at which the estate should terminate. The executor
is able to exercise a relatively free hand in selecting the precise
time within the tax year of the estate or its beneficiaries at which
the estate is to be terminated for income tax purposes. This time
point may have considerable tax importance in synchronizing the
flow of assets and income into the beneficiaries' tax pattern 0
(ii) Income Allocation upon Termination. The distributable net
income rules are equally applicable to termination distributions, but
since all the estate's property is distributed, no items of income or
gain will be taxed to the estate in that year. The final distribution
is likely to be the largest distribution in the administration and to
contain specified elements of income and corpus as reflected in the
executor's final accounting to the court. However, as discussed
above, the distributable net income scheme may cause distortions
in income inclusion by the beneficiaries at the time large distribu-
tions are made. The distribution rules do not distinguish the treat-
ment of a termination distribution; hence, the taking of properly
timed termination steps may have considerable income tax im-
portance.
(iii) Loss and Deduction Allocation upon Termination. Net
operating losses or capital losses unused by the estate in its final
year may be carried over to the beneficiaries to the extent they
would have been allowable to the estate in a taxable year sub-
sequent to the year of termination.9 1 Other unused deductions of
8 8 Actually, this period of time may be unduly conservative, but it should
represent the time for which the executor will be able to continue the
estate without income tax question under the present regulations. Wherejustifiable reasons have been shown, estates have been continued for 10
years or more. See Kennedy, Income Tax Problems of Decedents and Their
Estates, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 36, 49 (1953) ("The Commissioner has litigated
quite a few of these cases in the past eight or nine years and has won about
half the time. If it is desirable to maintain the estate as an extra taxpayer
beyond the time within which a reasonably diligent executor could complete
the administration, the executor should certainly not request an early audit
of the estate tax return. Just what steps he should take or should refrain
from taking is, like the proverbial family skeleton, not a proper subject for
public discussion.").
89 See Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (last sentence).
90 See I.R.C. § 662 (c). The beneficiary includes estate income in the return
for his individual tax year in which the estate's tax year ends.
91 I.R.C. § 642 (h) (1); Reg. § 1.642(h)-l.
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the estate may be carried over and used in the taxable year of the
beneficiary in which the estate terminates. 2 These provisions offer
possibilities for tax savings by the executor varying from the mere
carryover of otherwise unused losses or deductions, toward which
the section was apparently intended,93 to the outright manipulation
of intentionally creating a deduction which will be carried over to a
high bracket beneficiary in whose hands it has a greater tax value.
For example, an estate might make a final distribution to the low
bracket beneficiary in 1958, then early in 1959 pay large costs of
administration, make final distribution to the high bracket bene-
ficiary, and terminate. The income tax for 1958 has been shifted
to the low bracket beneficiary under the distributable net income
rules, and the termination deduction carryover provision gives the
high bracket beneficiary the full income tax benefit of the admin-
istration expenses. The over-all estate has saved tax dollars, but,
in the process, the high bracket beneficiary has benefited finan-
cially at the expense of the low bracket beneficiary.
(3) Effect Upon Fiduciary Responsibility. To a degree, the
income tax duties of the executor, which become highlighted by the
timing considerations, place a strain upon the underlying fiduciary
responsibilities which are stated generally in terms of the highest
degree of obligation. It would be an overstatement to say that an
executor must hold the estate's federal taxes to their absolute
minimum. But, unlike a private individual, he must use his rea-
sonable efforts to minimize taxes.9 4
More than just over-all tax dollars are involved in the decisions
which must be made. In many instances, the problems encountered
in minimizing taxes place the executor in the difficult position of
92 I.R.C. § 642 (h) (2); Reg. § 1.642(h)-2. For definition of the term "bene-
ficiary" and allocation of the carryovers among beneficiaries, see Reg. §§
1.642(h)-3 to 5. For use by a residuary trust or the beneficiaries thereof, see
Rev. Rul. 57-31, 1957 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 4, at 6.
93 See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 340 (1954). But cf. Fillman,
Selections From Subchapter J, 10 Tax L. Rev. 453, 474-7 (1955).
94Where adverse interests are not involved, the executor's duty is pre-
sumably that of the normal fiduciary-to use his reasonable efforts. As a
general rule, it would seem that an executor could be surcharged for an
overpayment of taxes, and a good faith intention to benefit the beneficiaries
would be immaterial. Where adverse interests are concerned, some authori-
ties seem to assume that the executor's duty is to minimize the taxes, even
at the risk of injury to a particular interest, but other sources indicate that
the executor may be surcharged by the injured parties for such actions. See
note 108 infra. What extraneous statements do appear from time to time
seem to be more the result of the writer's own personal feelings toward the
tax than of an actual body of fiduciary law.
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having to act with respect to competing interests. Granted that the
executor has a duty to minimize income taxes wherever legally
permissible and in the interests of the estate, the question still
remains as to whose income tax (or estate tax) is to be minimized.
Is the executor's duty limited to the use of the estate or trusts as
separate entities to save the income taxes of higher bracket bene-
ficiaries? Or could the executor force a distribution on a lower
bracket beneficiary for the purpose of saving taxes to the entire
estate? In the alternative: Is the executor personally liable if he
distributes to a high bracket beneficiary sooner than he might
actually need and the result is a higher income tax? Could the
executor be compelled to make a partial distribution to a low
bracket beneficiary for the purpose of saving income taxes? Could
the benefiting beneficiary be compelled to pay a part of the tax of
the nonbenefiting beneficiary where there is no element of detri-
ment,95 or could a distributee beneficiary be compelled to share
his tax savings with the other estate recipients where tax savings
had been a motive for the distribution?
The critical issue in this analysis is whether the executor can or
must pit the various competing interests against each other and
then make some choice as to how those interests should be evalu-
ated. Though it would save tax dollars to have the low bracket
beneficiary pay the income tax of the estate, that person may be
the one to whom the money would mean the most in terms of its
real value. Or, the low bracket beneficiary may simply have
squandered his previous wealth and have no appreciation of the
value of money.
In taking actions in this area, the executor must move without
being able to rely upon any definitive answers. There is no formal
mechanism whereby the various rights can be adjusted to rectify
the tax consequences, aside from a court direction. The executor
may protect himself from personal liability to a large extent by
beneficiary consents and court approvals, but this procedure is
difficult, time consuming, and costly. The effectiveness of any
testator direction of these activities will be greatly limited by the
multitude of unknown variable factors.
The guiding direction which the conscientious executor will
wish to supply will be made quite difficult by the presence of these
tax rules. The less conscientious executor may be able to conduct
95The cases to date, discussed at pages 358-361 below, have required
readjustment only to the extent of the detriment of the injured parties.
It would seem that the benefiting beneficiary should also share the net
tax savings with the other interests in the estate.
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his own game of "hand is quicker than the eye," or he may miss the
income allocation issues entirely. To the extent that nonexpert
executors are involved, or in estates where the beneficiaries cannot
agree upon the degree to which allocation for income tax savings
should be undertaken, the path of the Code is over thin ice without
the benefit of a body of state fiduciary or probate law to provide
any really useful signposts. Furthermore, this discussion assumes
an ability and a willingness to apply the complex Code provisions,
which may not be the case with respect to many executors and tax
officials.
2. Interaction of Income Tax With Estate Tax.
(a) Elective Deductions.
(1) Income Tax or Estate Tax Use. During the course of
administration, an executor may have expenses, losses, or payments
which can be used as tax deductions in one of the following ways:
(i) for estate tax only,96 (ii) for income tax only,97 (iii) for both
estate tax and income tax,98 and (iv) for either estate tax or income
tax, as elected by the executor.9 9 The first three types do not pose
problems involving a choice to the executor or persons interested
in the estate. Absent testamentary direction, the executor's duty is
presumably to use his reasonable efforts to make full use of them
as deductions.
With regard to certain charges involving administration ex-
96 For example, funeral expenses, unpaid mortgages, or similar claims
against the estate. Under the 1954 Code, expenses of administering property
not subject to claims may also be deductible. I. R. C. § 2053 (b). See,
generally, Krystal, Deductions-Estate Tax or Income Tax?, 94 Trusts &
Estates 489 (1955); Baker, Income Tax Planning for Executors, 9 Tax Law
Rev. 281, 287-93 (1954).
97 For example, business expenses exclusively for carrying on business
affairs of the estate, rather than in preparing for settlement and distribu-
tion. See George W. Oldham, 36 B.T.A. 523, 529 (1937) (prior to I.R.C. §
642 (g)).
98 For example, accrued interest on an outstanding mortgage, accrued
trade or business expenses, accounts payable, accrued property taxes, and
other expenses in respect of a decedent. I.R.C. §§ 642 (g) (last sentence),
691 (b), 2053 (a) (3).
99 See notes 100-102 infra.
100I.R.C. §§ 212, 642 (g), 2053 (a) (2). Administration expenses, such as
executor's and attorney's fees and court costs, may not need to be directly
related to income production to be deductible against income; it may be
sufficient that such expenses are for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income. Cf. Trust of
Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365, 373-7 (1945).
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penses,10 0 casualty or theft losses incurred during settlement of the
estate which are not compensated by insurance or otherwise, 10 '
and possibly periodic payments for alimony or separate mainte-
nance,'0 2 the executor may elect whether the items shall be taken
as deductions in the estate tax return or in the income tax return.
Here, to the extent that the expenses are used for one return rather
than the other, valuable financial interests of the various estate
recipients may be affected. For example, the use of the deductions
for income tax instead of estate tax will increase the gross estate
and thereby increase the amount to which a spouse would be
entitled under a marital deduction formula bequest.'0 3 Use of the
expenses against income will reduce the income tax and thereby
increase the net value passing to the probate income beneficiaries
(GROUP 1). But the persons paying the estate tax (GROUPS 3 and
4) will pay a higher tax because of the absence of the deductions
for estate tax purposes. Thus, the corpus of the estate tax groups
has been used to increase (i) the amount of the spouse's bequest,
and (ii) the share of the income beneficiaries. And, note, that
whereas the benefit runs initially to the probate income beneficiary
101 I.R.C. § 165 (c), 642 (g), 2054.
102See Rev. Rul. 56-43, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 210 ("Although section 642
(g) of the Code refers to the disallowance of double deductions, it is the
position of the Internal Revenue Service that such section contemplates
the disallowance, as a reduction in computing the taxable income of the
estate, of such items which have been allowed as a deduction in computing
the taxable estate."). But cf. Reg. § 1.642(g)-l (referring solely to admini-
stration expenses and losses during administration). The alimony deduc-
tion of I.R.C. § 215 is available only to a living husband and not to his
estate. Laughlin's Estate v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1948).
But a wife who receives amounts taxable to her under I.R.C. § 71 is con-
sidered a beneficiary of the estate. I.R.C. § 682 (b). Thus, the estate is
entitled to a distribution deduction for periodic alimony payments; and it
has been stated that in some situations the payments may be deducted
both as a claim against the estate, I.R.C. § 2053 (a) (3), and as a distribution
to a beneficiary, I.R.C. § 661. See Estate of Daniel G. Reid, 15 T.C. 573
(1950), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Izrastzoff v. Commissioner, 193
F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1952); Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 932
(1955). If Rev. Rul. 56-43, supra, is applied literally to alimony, it is not
clear how alimony payments would be handled in an estate which has
taken the claim as a deduction for estate tax purposes. Perhaps, the wife
would be considered as a creditor rather than a beneficiary; if not, there
is no method provided for making the necessary adjustments to distribut-
able net income. Furthermore, the rules concerning the inclusion and
character of the income to the wife as a beneficiary, I.R.C. § 662 (b), would
appear to conflict with the full inclusion principle of I.R.C. § 71 (a). See
note 54 supra.
103 Estate of Levy, 167 N.Y.S. 2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957). See Rev. Rul. 55-643,
1955-2 Cum. Bull. 386; Rev. Rul. 55-225, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 460.
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group (GROUP 1), the actual benefit may be further allocated to
specific members of that group by the application of the estate
distribution rules discussed above.
Having a duty to act, the executor might be advised that (i)
"it would be judicious to avail himself of the deduction in the place
where the optimum advantage will accrue to the estate,"'10 4 (ii)
where there is no estate tax, or only a nominal one, to be paid, the
deduction should generally be used for income tax rather than
estate tax,'10 5 and (iii) if there is doubt as to whether it is preferable
for an estate to use the expenses for income or estate tax purposes,
he should delay making his final choice'00 until the last possible
moment.1'07 Beyond this, there is no clear road to guide the executor
in making the actual decision where this issue is critical. For the
time being, the soundest legal advice will be that unless he has
obtained beneficiary consents for his proposed action, he should
request judicial instruction, and even with such consents the
executor should be certain that the interested b en e f i c i a r i e s
thoroughly understand the consequences and that appropriate pro-
bate court approval is given.10 8 The cases which have arisen to date
104 Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal.App.2d 326, 337, 295 P.2d 68, 74 (1956)
("Confronted with this elective treatment of deductions, the discreet ex-
ecutor will, of course, study the applicable estate tax and estate income
rates and if he finds that there is a wide disparity between them, it would
be judicious to avail himself of the deduction in the place where the
optimum advantage will accrue to the estate, that is, by diminishing the
aggregate amount of taxes payable to the federal government.").
105 See Bronston, Income Tax Returns By An Executor, 43 Ill. Bar J.
134, 137 (1954).
106Reg. § 1.642(g)-l. The statement of waiver of claim for estate tax
may be filed at any time before the statute of limitations on the income
tax return. Claiming the expense for estate tax purposes does not bar its
use for income tax purposes unless it has been finally allowed for estate
tax. However, once the statement of waiver is filed, the item cannot
thereafter be allowed for estate tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 240, 1953-2
Cum. Bull. 79. Items may be allocated between the estate and income
tax return in any desired manner, year by year, item by item, and part
of a single item to each return.
107 A.B.A. Sec. Tax. Bull. 14 (March 1954).
108 This, if for no other reason than that some authorities suggest that
an executor might be surcharged for using the deductions in such a way that
a beneficiary's interest is diminished, see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 Cum.
Bull. 386; Baker, Income Tax Planning For Executors, 9 Tax Law Rev. 281,
293 (1954), and others indicate that an executor is not performing his duty
unless he makes the maximum use of the potential tax deductions, see,
e.g., Estate of Bixby, 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 337, 295 P. 2d 68, 75 (1956).
See Fleming, "From Peter To Paul," 96 Trusts and Estates 1089 (1957);
Thrope, Corpus Expenses-A Fiduciary's Dilemma, 26 N.Y.C.P.A. 484 (1956).
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illustrate the extent to which the executor and probate courts will
find impossible situations, especially where the proposed use of
expenses for income tax or estate tax becomes entwined in the
distributable net income tangle.
In Bixby's Estate,1 0 9 there were (using rounded figures through-
out) $120,000 in administration expenses which could be used as
deductions for either income or estate tax. The top estate tax rate
was 49%, making the actual worth of the expenses for estate tax
$59,000. By using the $120,000 expenses against $160,000 estate in-
come for the yelar, the estate's income tax could be reduced from
$120,000 (tax on $160,000) to $19,000 (tax on $40,000) - a reduction
of $101,000. Thus, it was more profitable by $42,000 ($101,000 less
$59,000) to use the expenses for income tax than for estate tax.
Mrs. Bixby, the widow, was bequeathed shares of stock, which
under state law carried with them all income from the date of
death. She had no other interest in the estate, and succession taxes
were payable out of the residuary estate. Of the $160,000 income,
$76,000 were dividends on Mrs. Bixby's stock, so she was a 47%
income beneficiary in that year. No current distributions were
made, the expenses were used in the estate's income tax return,
and the $19,000 income tax was paid by the estate. When the time
came to compute the amount of the $76,000 to be actually distributed
to Mrs. Bixby, the parties were faced with these alternatives:
a. Mrs. Bixby should receive the full $76,000, since income
taxes are expenses of administration, and administration costs are
payable out of corpus.110
b. Mrs. Bixby should be charged for 47% of $19,000, the income
tax actually paid, but no further adjustment should be made. Rights
of the parties are determined in this respect after taxes, and that
means where the taxes may be used most advantageously. This
109 140 Cal. App. 2d 326, 295 P. 2d 68 (1956). See Note, 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
111 (1956).
110 This was the position taken by Mrs. Bixby's guardian ad litem. Gen-
erally, administration expenses are payable out of corpus. See, e.g., Estate
of Warms, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955); Estate of Levy, 167 N.Y.S. 2d
16 (Surr. Ct. 1957); Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 30, § 163 (1955). Recognizing that the
general rule of payment out of corpus applied to administration expenses,
the court nevertheless applied an "equitable principle that the burden of
the tax accompanies the income and should be borne by the account into
which the taxed item goes." In the alternative, the guardian argued that
Mrs. Bixby should be charged merely her share of the taxes actually paid,
and the lower court so held. Compare: Third Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 145
N.E.2d 703 (Mass. 1957).
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would cause the residuary beneficiaries to pay more estate tax,
however, so the lower income tax partially represents a share of
the corpus.
c. Mrs. Bixby should replenish 47% of $59,000 (in addition to
paying 47% of the $19,000), this being her proportionate share of the
added estate tax which will be charged to corpus. This leaves the
corpus "whole" but gives the entire $42,000 tax savings to the in-
come beneficiaries. The approach reasons, in effect, that allocation
of the expenses may affect the rights of the parties, but one party
cannot profit at the expense of another. So long as the residuary
estate is not reduced, this does not require any further amount of
tax savings to be shared with the corpus beneficiaries. But, since
the general administration expenses are charged to corpus, the
income beneficiaries would actually receive (i) expense free in-
come, plus (ii) $42,000 extra in the form of tax savings.
d. Mrs. Bixby should pay an income tax computed without
use of the corpus expenses, i.e., 47% of $120,000 (tax on $160,000).111
Since the expenses of administration are required to be paid out of
corpus, the remaindermen should be able to make use of them
against either income or estate tax for their own, not the income
beneficiaries', advantage. The income tax return should not change
the interests of beneficiaries of an estate since no one group has
an exclusive right to the use of the income tax return or to any
advantages therefrom . 2 But, although the expenses may be solely
the remaindermen's, still they are being used only against the in-
come beneficiaries' income.
111 This was the position taken by the executor. As an alternative, it
was argued that at least the corpus impairment should be restored. Thus,
both extremes were litigated in the case: Mrs. Bixby contending that
either no tax or only 47% of $19,000, the tax actually paid, should be
charged to her; the executor contending that Mrs. Bixby should be charged
47% of $120,000, the tax on $160,000 estate income, or at least 47% of
$78,000, the tax actually paid plus the corpus invasion.
112The use of the estate income tax return is an interesting aspect of
these cases. In Bixby's Estate, the remaindermen apparently wished to
secure the tax savings resulting from the use of corpus expenses against
the income beneficiaries' income, and to avoid the consequences of a wasted
deduction. But in Estate of Rice, notes 121 and 123 below, the remaindermen
employed a recomputed estate income tax return in which the corpus
expenses were used in the estate income tax return against capital gain,
but with the ordinary income considered as taxable to the distributee
beneficiaries. As yet, no case has litigated the proper use of the estate
income tax return for making the adjustment. This leaves unsettled the
crucial issue specifying the mechanical criteria upon which recomputation,
if any, is to be made.
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e. Mrs. Bixby should repay 47% of a figure more than $78,000
($59,000 plus $19,000) and less than $120,000 (tax on $160,000).
This would recognize that the executor in allocating the expenses
to income tax instead of estate tax is acting for the entire estate,
both income beneficiaries and remaindermen. Even though the ex-
tremities would be fixed, since there are no particularly significant
criteria for setting the final figure within this area, this solution
could result in confusion and litigation.
Bixby's Estate, the other cases reported to date,' 13 and probably
the bulk of the cases unreported as yet,1 14 have required the income
beneficiary to pay the tax on income and have adopted alternative
"c," a sort of "replenishment" theory which permits the income
beneficiaries to retain the entire net tax savings, but requires them
to replenish the amount of the principal invasion. In these cases, the
significant figure for replenishment has been the added estate tax
which the remaindermen were forced to pay. It is probable that
there will be further litigation urging alternatives "d" or "e". After
all, Mrs. Bixby and her fellow income beneficiaries ended up with
expense free income plus $42,000 extra, the entire net tax savings.
The corpus beneficiaries received none of the net savings.
Similarly, a New York Surrogate recently required restoration
of a $7,000 corpus reduction incurred in securing a $25,000 income
tax saving, but left intact the increase in amount passing to the
widow under a marital deduction formula bequest.115 The widow
benefited by the increased share, the income beneficiaries benefited
by the $18,000 net tax savings, but the remaining corpus beneficiaries
as such did not receive any share of the net tax savings.
113 Estate of Warms, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955); Estate of Levy,
167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957); Estate of Inman, 136 N.Y.L.J. No. 108, p.
6, col. 5 (Surr. Ct. Dec. 6, 1956).
114 See Fleming, "From Peter to Paul," 96 Trusts and Estates 1089 (1957);
Trautman & Wolf, Income Tax Problems in Trust and Estate Administration
64 (unpublished paper in Harvard Law School Library 1955) (field study
indicating that some bank fiduciaries are requiring that the income bene-
ficiary agree in advance to restore the corpus invasion); Sutter, Income
Taxation of Estates, 95 Trusts and Estates 1108, 1110 (1956).
115 Estate of Levy, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957). But in spite of the
fact that the Court permitted an increase in the widow's bequest by one-
half of the amount of the deductions used for income tax purposes, the
opinion states: "The election permitted by the Internal Revenue Code
does not authorize the executors to vary the interest of the legatees."
Id. at 18. See, generally, Bronston, Tax Problems of Formula Type of Marital
Deduction Bequest, 1957 A.B.A. Sec. of Real Prop., Probate and Trust Law
Proc. 96.
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The Massachusetts Court has reached an apparently contrary
result in an analogous trust situation, however.i 5a The trust re-
ceived dividends which were treated as a return of capital for
federal income tax purposes, and thus reduced the tax basis of the
assets. Under Massachusetts law, the dividends were paid to the
income beneficiaries, who treated the income as nontaxable. Later,
the trust corpus was sold at a profit, causing an additional capital
gain to result from the decreased income tax basis. The remainder-
men, being required to pay the increased tax on capital gains,
urged that the income beneficiaries should be charged with so much
of the tax as was occasioned by the reduction in basis due to the
dividends received by the income beneficiaries. In the interests of
simplicity of trust administration, the Court refused to require any
reimbursement by the income beneficiariesl1b The income bene-
ficiaries received nontaxable income and the remaindermen were
left with a tax on that much more capital gain.
(2) Effect of Distributions Upon Income Tax Use. The most
difficult problems under the present code provisions are in the
area where the elective deduction becomes entwined with the
distribution rules. How would current distributions have affected
the rights of the parties in Bixby's Estate? For illustration pur-
poses, assume that the specific bequest exclusion were not ap-
plicable to the Bixby facts.1 6 (i) Suppose the $76,000 dividends
had been distributed currently to Mrs. Bixby. Since the benefici-
ary's taxable income is limited to distributable net income, she
15a Third Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 145 N.E.2d 703 (Mass. 1957). See Rev.
Rul. 24, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 263; but cf. McCullough v. Commissioner, 153
F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1946); Florence M. Sweet, 44. B.T.A. 871 (1941), nonacq.,
1941-2 Cum. Bull. 23. It is interesting to note that the McCullough case, and
the precedent therefor, Johnson v. Helvering, 141 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1944),
involved one of the situations which the distributable net income tier system
of the 1954 code was designed to cure. Those decisions, however, may not
have been applied by the commissioner if Rev. Rul. 24, supra, were followed,
and this situation can still cause serious problems, as illustrated by Third
Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, supra.
115b Id. at 706 ("In practical operation, the application of the principle
behind this ingenious contention would destroy the simplicity of the Massa-
chusetts rules of allocation of trust receipts and expenses as between life
tenant and remainder interests and might even work with great unfair-
ness."). See note 112 supra; notes 117, 120, 123 and 124 infra.
116 The actual facts involved a specific bequest of 19,000 shares of stock.
I.R.C. § 663 (a) (1). This operates to protect a corpus distribution of the
shares, but quaere whether it would also protect a distribution of ac-
cumulated income from the shares? The separate share rule is not applicable
to estates. I.R.C. § 663 (c).
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would have been taxed individually on only $40,000 ($160,000, estate
income, less the $120,000 expenses). What would she have been
required to replenish? 117 (ii) How would the presence of capital
gains have been taken into consideration? Had the income other
than Mrs. Bixby's dividends been capital gains, and only the amount
of the dividends distributed, there would have been no distribut-
able net income,118 so Mrs. Bixby would have had to include none
of the distribution as income in her individual return. To what
extent would Mrs. Bixby be required to replenish in this situa-
tion? Would the result be different if Mrs. Bixby were in a higher
income tax bracket than the estate?
Furthermore, if the specific bequest exclusion does not oper-
ate to protect the accumulated income element of the bequest, Mrs.
Bixby may be subject to additional income tax consequences in
the year of its distribution, to the extent of the estate's distributable
net income in the later year. Even if such a tax rests generally with
the distributee alone, could payment of the tax resulting from a
distribution be taken into consideration in the fiduciary accounting
for the consequences of elective deduction use?119 If so, there would
be a difference if Mrs. Bixby's individual income tax bracket were
higher or lower than the estate's. If Mrs. Bixby reimburses the
estate for its tax payments or the estate reimburses Mrs. Bixby
for her tax payments, is there a possibility that such reimburse-
ment of taxes gives rise to additional taxable income?120
117 In this example, Mrs. Bixby will pay the tax on the entire distribut-
able net income, and the rest of the estate income will not be subject to
tax. Mrs. Bixby has benefited from the corpus expenses by having to
include only $40,000 in income instead of $76,000, but compared with the
other income beneficiaries who are charged for no income tax, she has
been injured. Thus, she has benefited at the expense of the remaindermen,
but not in the same amount as the other income beneficiaries. If the net
tax savings are to be apportioned, it would seem to be necessary to know
Mrs. Bixby's individual income tax rate to determine her actual tax benefit
in solving the mathematical problem involved. But, if this is the case,
should the tax brackets of the other estate beneficiaries also be considered
in order to equitably weigh the net tax savings? And the problem would
be further complicated if distributions were made to the other beneficiaries.
118 The $120,000 expenses would cancel out Mrs. Bixby's $76,000 dividends.
119 At least, this would seem to be a factor which the executor should
take into consideration in planning the estate operation.
120 To the extent that the parties intentionally engage in a manipulation
of income tax which is later reimbursed by the benefiting parties, there
would appear to be the possibility of added income tax consequences to
either the party whose income tax is reimbursed by another, or to the
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In Estate of Rice,12 1 a trust had taxable interest and dividends
of $395,000 and long term capital gains of $402,000 for 1954. None of
the capital gains were distributed. The trust had administration
expense deductions of $202,000 charged to "principal" and $154,000
charged to "income." Using proper fiduciary accounting rules, the
$241,000 trust income ($395,000 less $154,000) was distributed to
the income beneficiary. However, applying the concept of dis-
tributable net income only $39,000 was taxable to the income bene-
ficiary ($395,000, less $154,000 and $202,000) .122 But the trust was
required to pay approximately $100,000 income tax on the capital
gains for 1954. The state probate court held that since the trust
would have paid no income tax if the principal expenses had been
applied against principal income ($402,000 capital gain, less $201,000
capital gain deduction 123 and $202,000 corpus expenses), the $100,000
should be charged entirely to "income" so that principal would
not be used to pay the tax on ordinary income. Thus, the income
beneficiary was required to repay the value to corpus of the tax
deductions allocated to the income beneficiary by the 1954 Code
rules of distributable net income; but the income beneficiary still
party whose income tax is paid for him for a fee. Also, where reimburse-
ment is to be made in the fiduciary accounts, it would seem that the ex-
ecutor would have a duty to withhold the amounts which will be required
to be repaid. But the amount may be impossible to calculate at the time
of the proposed distribution. See Third Nat'l Bank v. Campbell, 145 N.E.2d
703 (Mass. 1957).
1218 Pa. D. & C. 2d 379 (Orph. Ct. 1956). No appeal was taken since the
life beneficiary died some time after the trial.
122 This is the consequence of the corpus deduction problem, discussed
at page 342 above.
123 I.R.C. § 1202. Note that the tax paid was computed using the alterna-
tive capital gains tax, but the tax for purposes of readjustment was figured
using the ordinary capital gains deduction. Had there been no distributions,
the alternative tax would also have been advantageous, but there would
have been an income tax paid by the estate. Would the remaindermen
be charged a proportionate amount of the estate income tax had there been
no distribution, or would the estate income tax be recomputed as if there
had actually been a distribution? The interests of the remaindermen are
different in this situation than in Bixby's Estate, note 112 supra. There,
the remaindermen would desire to compute the fiduciary accounting as if
there had been no distribution in order to secure the full benefit of the
corpus expenses, even if a distribution had in fact been made. In Estate
of Rice, the remaindermen would desire to have the fiduciary accounts
assume there was a distribution, so as to avoid a contribution to income
tax as otherwise computed, whether or not there was an actual distribution.
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retained the entire net tax savings of $70,000.124 The amount of
repayment was not based upon use of the expenses by the re-
maindermen against estate tax, but against income tax, and even
then with a court-imposed engrafting of some fiduciary accounting
concepts in lieu of the statutory distributable net income scheme.
Estate of Rice is only the first word on the effect of distributable
net income upon the use of administration expenses. The really
tough problems will arise in estates where there could be both
distributions and an election to use the expenses for estate tax pur-
poses.' 25 Here, someone will have to untangle the effect of the de-
ductions for estate tax, estate income tax under federal tax rules,
estate income tax using fiduciary accounting concepts, or in the re-
turns of the estate beneficiaries. Each general type may involve
several variations, and the types could be combined in different mix-
tures. After these effects are computed, there is still the question of
how the "tax savings" should be shared. Unless some readjustment is
made as a result of the actual incidence of taxes, the financial in-
terests of the estate recipients will be subordinated to the contin-
gency of which allocation of the elective deductions will produce the
lowest over-all tax burden at the particular time the choice has
to be made.
(b) Valuation and Optional Valuation.
The valuation of the estate for estate tax purposes, or the choice
whether to utilize the optional valuation date,126 may involve a
conflict between virtually any interests in the estate. The optional
valuation date may be selected for either a higher or lower gross
estate valuation, in any estate larger than the statutory $60,000
exemption.127 Whatever valuation is finally used in the estate tax
124To make the observation that the distributee beneficiary retained
the net tax savings of $70,000, the court must have considered the bene-
ficiary's individual income tax rate, which approached the maximum in-
come tax rate. This may be the forewarning of some virtually impossible
computations by the executor in planning for distributions and by probate
courts in approving distributions or adjusting the rights of the parties for
the tax consequences thereof, where the status of the various beneficiaries
is not so clearly established.
12 5 See note 124 supra. In addition, the estate tax alternatives are added.
Estate of Warms, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 169 (Surr. Ct. 1955) was cited with approval
in the opinion. Also see notes 117 and 119 supra. However, Estate of Rice
does not involve the choice of use of the deductions against estate tax.
126 I.R.C. § 2032.
127 Rev. Rul. 55-333, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 449; Rev. Rul. 56-60, 1956-1 Cum.
Bull. 443.
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return becomes the recipient's basis of the property for income
tax purposes. 2 It is now settled that, absent testamentary direc-
tion, the nonprobate takers may be called upon to contribute to
the federal estate tax' 2P--by federal statute in the case of life in-
surance proceeds 30 and property over which the decedent had a
power of appointment,131 by apportionment statute in some states, 1 2
and by judicial decision in others. 33 Thus, the recipients of non-
probate property included in the gross estate for estate tax pur-
poses, such as an intervivos trust, a gift in contemplation of death,
jointly held property, insurance proceeds and appointive assets,
may have estate tax and income tax consequences based upon
the action of the probate estate executor.
In a period of rising prices, the probate income tax group
(GROUP 1) and the nonprobate income tax group (GROUP 2)
will desire a higher valuation in order to obtain a higher basis for
future gains or losses. The higher valuation can result both from
fighting for the highest value within the band of reasonableness
and selecting the highest of the possible dates. The probate estate
tax group (GROUP 3) and the nonprobate estate tax group
(GROUP 4) will wish to secure the lowest valuation in order to
minimize estate taxes.
If only the probate estate property has increased. in value, then
the probate income tax group (GROUP 1) will want a higher
valuation, and the probate estate tax group (GROUP 3) a lower
valuation. But, because the estate tax rate is progressive and ap-
portionment only proportional, the_ nonprobate estate tax group
(GROUP 4) may also pay more estate tax. If the value of the pro-
bate property increased and the nonprobate property decreased,
then the probate income tax group (GROUP 1) would want the
optional valuation date for a higher income tax basis, and the non-
probate estate tax group (GROUP 4) for a lower estate tax pay-
ment; but the 6ptional valuation would cost the probate estate
128 I.R.C. § 1014 (a).
129 Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
130 I.R.C. § 2206.
131 I.R.C. § 2207.
132 For a collection of statutes, see Sutter, How To Plan For Apportion-
ment Of Estate Taxes, Lasser's Estate Tax Techniques 2137, 2139 n.1 (1955).
133 Id. at 2146-9.
134 Estate of Levy, 167 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
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tax group (GROUP 3) more for estate tax, and the nonprobate
income tax group (GROUP 2) would have a lower income tax
basis for its property.
As a practical matter, some of the property within any particu-
lar group may increase and other property decrease during the op-
tional valuation period, so that the choice in addition to involving
the group interests will be broken down into individual interests
within the group. And, aside from the tax considerations, the dollar
amount of property to be received by persons having a percentage
share of the estate, such as the spouse receiving a formula be-
quest,134 may depend upon the valuation given the gross estate for
estate tax purposes. It thus appears that the executor may be com-
pelled to make significant decisions which affect the nonprobate
recipients (in the case of the marital deduction, possibly a nontax-
able interest) to whom he has no clearly defined fiduciary duty, and
whose interests may be opposed to the interests of the probate estate
takers which he has been judicially appointed to protect.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REVISION
A. SCOPE FOR LEGISLATIVE REVIsION
Perhaps the most criticised aspect of income taxation of estates
under both the 1939 and 1954 Codes has been that they have not
provided workable rules for persons associated with fiduciary re-
sponsibilities. Just what rules would be workable is not at all
clear. On the one hand, the relatively simple solutions for estate
income taxation may be criticised as not having a sufficient depth
to provide a basic equity to the parties involved. But, on the other,
the more complex provisions which have been suggested from time
to time in an effort to work out an underlying fairness have been
criticised as being too difficult to follow, and the 1939 and 1954
Codes appear to have been widely ignored in practice primarily
because of purported difficulties of application.1 35 Simplicity is
certainly a desired goal in designing an income tax structure, but
it may not be possible to create a fully simplified federal tax law
to cover probate administration activities carried on under state law
135Although no survey has been made of compliance with the 1954
Code, see A.B.A. Section Tax. Bull. 2 (Oct. 1955); statement of Laurens Wil-
liams, 1956 ALI Proceedings 716. Concerning the 1939 Code, see, e.g., Gris-
wold, Federal Taxation 288 (4th ed. 1955); Report of The Committee on
Taxation of Income of Estates and Trusts, A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Pro-
gram and Committee Reports 85 (1953).
PROBATE INCOME TAX
concepts which are themselves quite complex, and in many in-
stances unsettled or in conflict. 13 G
The central issue with which immediate statutory revision
should deal is that of providing a workable system for handling
estate distributions. Of the various probate administration tax
duties or choices having valuable financial effects with respect to
competing interests, discussed in Part II, the distribution problems
pose the most important task in creating an effective estate in-
come tax scheme. This is not to minimize other issues, but the dis-
tribution problems are by themselves the most complicating fac-
tors, and they become even more difficult as they are magnified
into other areas, such as the use of elective deductions. Along with
the distribution problems are the general issues relating to timing;
and as some sort of a relatively simple mechanical test is worked
out which will effectively relate the income tax to the income
items and their recipients, attention should be given to a reduction
of the executor's present problems of timing his probate actions
for tax purposes. The issues of estate duration and termination
seem especially suited to legislative action.
The looseness in determining just what property falls within
an estate may actually provide a useful flexibility for planning
and managing the over-all estate. What problems there may be
have not produced a significant volume of litigation over the many
years they have existed. Although these issues will be raised in
a federal court concerning state law transmission of property and
the same issues may never be litigated in the state courts,137 there
would appear to be no serious reason why this area should not be
left for future administrative regulation and judicial decision. Also,
revised distribution rules would remove some of the income tax
emphasis which now rests upon the choice whether property is in-
cluded in or excluded from the probate estate.
Where the income tax becomes interrelated with estate tax,
136 See Paul, Taxation For Prosperity 411 (1947) ("This perennial problem
of degree permeates all legal activity. Tax statutes must be drawn so that
they may be as easily understood as possible. But in the rush for simplicity
they must preserve their contact with the complexity of modem life; they
must be firmly rooted in our fast-moving underlying experience .... In
tax law, as more generally, there are almost always competing considera-
tions. What is simple may not be equitable. What is equitable may of
necessity be complicated. In other words, simplicity and equity are often
incompatible and we are forced to choose between them.").
137 This appears to have been the situation in many of the cases con-
tained in notes 15-24 supra.
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the problems involve a placing of stress on both the internal opera-
tion of the income tax law and the correlation of estate tax and
income tax. Optional valuation would appear to be of the latter
type, and is more within the scope of a separate study on coordinat-
ing the workings of the two taxes than of this paper. The fact that
estate property picks up a higher or lower basis is of no particular
consequence to the internal operation of the estate income tax allo-
cation system, although it may have considerable interest to the
individuals involved in the estate.
The elective deductions do, however, provide a situation in
which estate tax considerations may distort income tax operation.
Many corpus expenses of an estate can be deducted for either in-
come tax or estate tax. When income tax use is elected, there is
an overloading of the income tax with high expenses which are
likely to be paid at one time or in large blocks. This accentuates
the problems of distributions, makes timing considerations more
important, and, in practice, is likely to throw against income ex-
penses which cannot be wholly justified as being true income-pro-
ducing costs. Here, too, reformation of the distribution rules will
alleviate the most difficult aspect of the problem. Closer adminis-
trative scrutiny should be applied to the specific expenses avail-
able for charge against income.
Insofar as the choice of income tax or estate tax use of the de-
ductions is concerned, the apportionment of net tax savings or
reimbursement for losses to particular interests within the estate
would appear to be a proper function for state probate courts and
for testamentary direction.138 Having to make such adjustment is
not the result of unwarranted intrusion by the federal income tax
law, for, by hypothesis, with appropriate adjustment all parties
interested in the probate estate will benefit at the expense of the
federal government. And, in any event, the problem arises only
with respect to an advantageous election exercised by the estate.
This leaves as foremost in the legislative solution stage a resolu-
tion of the issues pertaining to distributions. Solving the distribu-
tion problem is essentially that of ferreting out the various aspects
of estate income and relating the tax to the person actually receiv-
ing income items or the benefit from them. It is helpful to analyze
the suggested solutions which have been advanced for handling
estate income taxation. Following this, there will be presented an
outline of a proposal for revision and analysis of this proposal.
138 See Fleming, "From Peter to Paul," 96 Trusts and Estates 1089 (1957).
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B. SOMM SUGGESTED APPROACHES
Consideration of the comprehensive recommendations to date
involves principally an analysis of proposals of the American Law
Institute and of the Advisory Group on Subchapter J of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, to the House Subcommittee on In-
ternal Revenue Taxation. The activities of the Institute provided
the working nucleus for Subchapter J of the 1954 Code and have
continued to be a driving force for further revision perfecting
the operation of these sections. The Advisory Group has recently
proposed a thorough overhaul for the Subchapter J mechanism.
Under the 1952 Institute Draft,139 estates were treated as separ-
ate tax entities. Income was taxable to the estate and was not in-
cludable by the beneficiaries even though distributions were
made,140 but the estate could elect to be treated as a trust, in which
case the general trust rules were applicable (except throwback,
but including separate share),4 Separate entity treatment for
estates was an attempt to provide a simpler treatment for the
majority of estates, coupled with recognition that estates have a dif-
ferent method and purpose of operation than a trust, and, in general,
offer fewer tax avoidance possibilities. The election to be treated as a
trust was intended to give relief to the estates in which the ulti-
mate beneficiaries are in lower tax brackets than the estate, by
continuing opportunities for "skillful manipulation" of the tax
liability through controlled distributions. Distributions at an early
date would also permit the income to be earned by and taxed to the
low bracket beneficiary rather than the estate. An unduly extended
administration, of particular advantage to low bracket estates with
higher bracket beneficiaries, would be cut off and the estate treated
as a trust from that date.142
The American Bar Association patterned its recommended
estate income tax provisions after the 1952 American Law Insti-
139 ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1952). For a discussion
of this statute by its principal draftsmen, see Holland, Kennedy, Surrey and
Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of
Trusts and Estates-American Law Institute Draft, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 316,
354 (1953).
140 Id §§ X875, X885 (a).
141 Id. §§ X876, X885 (b), X821.
142 Id. § X877 (taxable years beginning more than three years after
decedent's death). This provision was not intended to limit the power of
the Commissioner to treat the heirs and legatees as the true owners in
the case of an unduly prolonged administration. Id. at 457, 460. See Reg. §
1.641(b)-3.
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tute Draft. 143 The same elective treatment was retained in the 1954
American Law Institute proposal, 4 4 which also made the throw-
back rules applicable to estates treated as trusts.
However, the 1954 Code emerged with mandatory treatment
of an estate as a complex trust, without separate share or throw-
back rules applicable, and with only the distributable net income
tier system and the gift exclusion as a protecting dike for genuine
corpus bequests. The issues which these rules may raise in pro-
bate estate administration have been outlined in Part II of this
paper.
In preparing the 1954 Code, it may have been felt that sim-
plicity would not really be provided by giving elective treatment,
because the executor, instead of having to work with just one set
of rules, which were, by the argument, too complex for general
usage, would then have to contend with two sets of rules, one
simple and one involved, plus a possibly difficult election. But, at
least an easy route for many estates might have been provided. If,
as it appears, fiduciary practice under the 1954 Code is avoiding
a precise compliance with the statute in many cases, the early fears
of the Institute over the complexity of its general trust rules as
applied to estates would be borne out.
In 1956, the American Law Institute presented two alternatives
for revision of the Code's treatment of estate income tax.145 The
first would revise the existing system, and the second would estab-
lish mandatory taxation as a separate entity for an estate in ad-
ministration. Under Alternative I, (a) separate share treatment
would be extended to estates, (b) widow's allowances not paid
out of income, and any nonbusiness tangible personal property
not exceeding a total value of $10,000, would be excluded from the
tier system, and (c) the tier system, itself, would be modified in the
case of estates to include (i) in the first tier, any of the year's
income required to be distributed or which is actually distributed,
though not required, and (ii) in the second tier, any other distri-
bution.146 Alternative II, the officially preferred Institute position,147
143 Report of the Committee on Taxation of Income of Estates and Trusts,
A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Program and Committee Reports 63, 86 (1953).
The committee report received official endorsement and recommendation
by the Association. 79 A.B.A. Rep. 459, 472, 492 (1954).
144 II ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. (Feb. 1954 Draft).
145 ALI Fed. Income, Estate and Gift Tax Stat. (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1956).
146 Id. at 148-52, Cf. II ALI Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X827 (a) (Feb. 1954
Draft).
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is a proposal for mandatory treatment as a separate entity, with
the trust rules applicable to taxable years beginning after 51
months, but the statute was also intended to permit the Commis-
sioner to relate the income to the heirs and legatees directly where
administration was unduly prolonged.148 In addition to these estate
provisions, revisions in the income taxation of trusts were also
thoroughly considered by the Institute.
The 1956 Committee on Income of Estates and Trusts of the
American Bar Association recommended that the estate be taxed
as a separate entity during administration, but provided an elec-
tion to be treated as a trust and a cut-off after 51 months, quite
similar to the earlier proposals of the Association and the Insti-
tute. 49 The recommendation was not among the many provisions
endorsed by the Association,'5" presumably in deference to the
Institute's alternative recommendations.
During 1957, an Advisory Group on Subchapter J of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, to The House Subcommittee on In-
ternal Revenue Taxation, prepared a full scale report of sug-
gested changes in the income tax structure for estates and trusts.'51
The attack of this Group on the estate distribution problem was to
provide a broadened corpus exclusion, applicable only to estates,
which would exclude from the tier system any amount paid or
credited out of corpus in full or partial satisfaction of a bequest,
share, award or allowance during a period of administration not ex-
ceeding 36 months. 152 In addition, the reports contain recommenda-
147 1956 ALI Proceedings 721.
148ALI Fed. Income, Estate and Gift Tax Stat. 152-6, 161-5 (Tent. Draft
No. 11, 1956).
149Report of the Comniittee on Income of Estates and Trusts, A.B.A.
Section of Taxation, Program and Committee Reports 92 (1956).
150 81 A.B.A. Rep. 156, 161-6 (1956).
151First Report on Estates, Trusts, Beneficiaries, and Decedents, Re-
ceived By The House Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation (May
8, 1957); Revised First Report on Estates, Trusts, Beneficiaries, and De-
cedents, Received By The House Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxa-
tion (Nov. 22, 1957).
152 Revised First Report, Id., at 29: "Sec. 663 .... (a) EXCLUSIONS.-
There shall not be included as amounts falling within section 661 (a) or
662 (a)- . . . (2) OTHER GIFTS, BEQUESTS, ETC.-Any amount, other
than capital gains considered paid, credited, or required to be distributed
under section 643 (a) (3) (B), which under the terms of the governing instru-
ment or applicable local law is an amount which is not to be paid or
credited at intervals and which is properly paid or credited in full or partial
satisfaction of a bequest, share, award or allowance from the corpus of a
decedent's estate during a period beginning with the day following the
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tions for an improved treatment of corpus deductions, 153 making
the separate share rule applicable to estates, 5 4 and eliminating a
number of the other specific present problems.155
The Advisory Group's recommendations would appear to be
an improvement over the 1954 Code provisions, in that the existing
inequities whereby one beneficiary may benefit at the expense of
another would be lessened. This may be all the plan purports to
do.156 But what is employed is admittedly a tracing approach simi-
lar to that under the 1939 Code,157 and the tracing approach of the
1939 Code seems to have been admittedly impractical. Further,
the estate may still be treated, at least in part, under a trust
mechanism which is basically meaningless in terms of normal
probate estate operation. Insofar as the estate is handled under the
proposed new four tier system of allocation of income of trusts and
estates,'158 supplanting the present two (or three, counting the
charitable middle tier) tiers, the income taxation of an estate is
governed by clothing tailored to fit an entirely different situation,
and which does not offer workable rules for estate executors. One
committee member dissented from the First Report for this rea-
son,159 but another, Laurens Williams, hastened to add in the Re-
death of the decedent and ending 36 months thereafter. A payment shall
be deemed to have been made from corpus of a decedent's estate to the
extent it is properly charged against corpus and designated as a distribution
of corpus on the books and records of the estate by the fiduciary." In
addition, the fiduciary is permitted to set aside an amount for the purpose
of meeting existing or potential estate obligations which are payable out
of estate income.
153 Id. at 15, 17.
154 Id. at 30, 34.
155 For example, identification of capital gains, Id. at 14, 16; elimination
of the dividends received credit problem, Id. at 9, 11; a new charitable
deduction arrangement, Id. at 9, 11 (and related references); loss carryover
provision is made applicable to separate shares, Id. at 10, 14; and certain
of the present regulations have been given code status.
156 See Id. at 31.
157 Ibid.
158 Id. at 24. The four tier system proposed is designed to relieve the
inequities between beneficiaries receiving discretionary income payments
and those receiving corpus. Under this system, the order of priority would
be: (1) required to be paid currently out of current income; (2) discre-
tionary out of current income, (3) discretionary out of current income or
out of corpus or accumulated income, (4) all other amounts paid, credited
or required to be distributed. Charitable beneficiaries are placed in the
fourth tier.
'59 First Report, note 151 supra, 49; also, Revised First Report, note 151
supra, at 57.
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vised First Report that although he, too, would favor taxing an
estate as an individual, the Advisory Group did not consider
the proposal at this time, as such an amendment would be a "major
change in the taxing pattern," and thus it was held for consider-
ation by the Group at a later date.160
What the actual results of the various proposals will be when
the many factors of securing legislation have been dealt with is
somewhat problematical. It is heartening to note that there is
considerable sentiment for designing a special set of code provi-
sions to deal with income taxation of estates. But the horses are
pulling in two directions. There is the demand for a simple method
of handling almost all estates. There is also a demand to retain
"substantial opportunities for minimization of tax" by the estate,
especially where simply lumping everything together in one tax-
able entity for income tax purposes may not reach fully fair results
in certain types of estates. 16 ' It does seem that the nature of the leg-
islative beast is such that it is likely to evolve some sort of elective
device balancing simplicity for most estates and tax savings for a
few estates where more difficult provisions may be necessary.
C. OUTLINE OF A PROPOSAL FOR REVISION
The following is an outline of a proposal for legislative revision,
based upon the factors presented in this paper.
1. The estate should be treated as a distinct entity for not more
than x-months.
2. Consideration should be given to whether income splitting, per-
sonal exemptions, medical deductions, etc., should be made avail-
able to the estate where the persons interested in the estate are
within a sufficiently close family relationship.
3. After the expiration of x-months, or if administration is unrea-
sonably extended (whether more or less than x-months), the Com-
missioner should be given the power under a specially designed
version of section 482 to allocate income in a manner which will
clearly reflect the actual interests of the parties (or'to reflect the
rights of the parties when they may ultimately become deter-
mined); in the absence of such action by the Commissioner, the
estate should be treated as follows after x-months:
a. The present separate share rule should be broadened to
160 Revised First Report, note 151 supra, at 58.
161 See, e.g., Vernon, Allocation of Trust and Estate Income and Deduc-
tions Among Beneficiaries, Tax Forum No. 183, March 4, 1957 (unpublished);
Statement of Kenneth W. Bergen, note 159 supra.
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apply to estates; further, in the case of estates, the rigid require-
ments for qualification as a separate share should be relaxed in
favor of a broad concept covering any separate interest which is
discernible in fact, whether of income or corpus, or both (thus,
including the present specific bequest exclusion plus any corpus
bequest, income bequest, or other bequest which is capable of a
separate identity); and the concept should apply to carryovers
upon termination.
b. Subject to the separate share rules, the following tier sys-
tem would apply to distributions:
(1) first tier: all distributions of current year's income would
be includable by the beneficiaries and deductible by the estate; but
any additional required income distributions (and the term should
include bequests required by the governing instrument or ap-
plicable state law to be paid at any time out of the current year's
income) should be taxed to the estate.
(2) second tier: operating as the present second tier on any
income not taxed under the first tier to either the beneficiaries or
to the estate.
c. Throwback rules should be applicable, unlimited in time
and with perfected mechanics.
4. If there is to be an elective method within x-months (which is
not recommended), then shift to the post x-months plan at that
time rather than to the trust rules.
D. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSAL FOR REVIsION
Taxing estates as separate entities would provide a simplified
treatment for estate income taxation. But it should be frankly
realized that expediency is the principal factor in this selection.
True, it may be reasoned that this is merely the decedent con-
tinued for up to x more months, but it is equally plausible to urge
that, in many cases, the devisees should be considered as the parties
in interest as of decedent's death, and examples could be presented
in which the estate would involve more than merely decedent con-
tinued.16 2 The entity concept does not include adjustment for the
162 These could involve various types of augmentation of estate at death
in the form of capital accretions, e.g., life insurance and employee death
benefits, or of income items, e.g., the various forms of income in respect
of a decedent (which, additionally, may be bunched within a short period
after death). Furthermore, the spouse and family may be deprived of the
services and many of the tax attributes of the decedent, or of reliance
upon a steady income.
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fact that the composite is actually a number of individual and group
interests. The income tax would be related to the income items
through the fiduciary accounts, so this important aspect of relating
tax to income would at least be superficially met. The tax might
not represent the beneficiaries' precise individual income position,
as if the estate were wholly ignored, but the inequity would seem
to be less than under the present rules.
Further, there is a certain flexibility even in mandatory treat-
ment as an entity, especially by testator planning and well-timed
distributions. The use of distributions to apportion income is limited
to anticipatory distributions rather than the "after the fact" dis-
tributions which could be made under both the 1939 and 1954 Codes.
Those advance distributions which are made for tax purposes would
seem to serve a number of socially desirable purposes, however. To
the low bracket beneficiary, there is an earlier distribution which
gives him wealth in a more usable form, with a lower ultimate in-
come tax, 16 3 and without the possibility of distorting his indi-
vidual income tax as under the present distributable net income
rules. At the same time, the distributions will reduce the tax of
the other estate beneficiaries by lowering the top estate income tax
rate, and thus reducing the tax to be apportioned in fiduciary
accounts.
It might also be that if the estate is really to be considered as
decedent continued for x-months, it should be given some of the
tax advantages which decedent would have had if alive. These could
include, for example, income splitting, 6 4 personal exemptions,
and medical deductions, when within the family group. From the
standpoint of an abstract equity, this would approach the most de-
sirable result of simply having the beneficiaries step into decedent's
shoes as of the moment of death (but given certain income tax
benefits), and would seem to impose little in the way of burden ofn
probate administration. If these advantages were made available to
an estate, they should be limited to close family situations in which
the estate is, in reality, another member of the family income unit.
There is sizable current controversy over how an estate should
be taxed when it is no longer taxed as an estate. The two leading
103 The low bracket beneficiary taxed individually receives the benefit
of his own favorable tax rate. If taxed to the estate, his share of income
will be charged the average estate income tax rate as his proportionate
share of the taxes paid by the estate.
164 Cf. I.R.C. § 2. But this provision relates only to income taxed to the
spouse, and does not cover the income which remains taxable in the estate.
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concepts seem to be treatment of the estate as a trust and an at-
tempt to relate the items of income and deduction directly to the
beneficiaries. Admittedly, the trust garment does not fit the estate
operation, although it may be closer at the end of x-months than
earlier in the administration. It is not at all clear what it means to
attempt to relate the income directly to the beneficiaries. The prob-
lem here is extremely difficult because it involves conjecture on
conjecture. Estates in this class will involve an unknown composi-
tion of property and interests, and have an extended administration
for a number of possible reasons. The equities may vary signifi-
cantly from estate to estate. In this situation, it seems appropriate
to give the Commissioner broad power under a specially designed
version of present section 482165 to allocate income in a manner
which will clearly reflect the actual interests of the parties (or
to reflect the rights of the parties when they may ultimately be-
come determined). Perhaps, the trust rules would fit some extended
administrations. Perhaps, the income could be directly attributed
to the beneficiaries. Many other factual environments could exist
and different solutions might be adopted. At least, such a power in
the Commissioner would serve as an escape valve if any particularly
abusive practices developed.
It is generally agreed that the separate share rules, now limited
to trusts, should also be applied to estates. 166 To the extent separate
shares exist, there will be a tendency to place corpus and income
going to a beneficiary in a single unit, and to limit the beneficiary's
taxable income maximum to just that income falling within his own
share. This will lessen the problem of one beneficiary's paying a
tax based upon another's income. Although it would seem advan-
tageous to recognize the separate share at the earliest possible time
in the administration, it may be impossible (i) in the initial stages,
and (ii) under state law or dispositive arrangements which do not
operate as presently defined separate shares. For a period of time
after assuming the administration duties, an executor may lack the
full information necessary for separate share treatment. Further,
165 I.R.C. § 482: "In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or
businesses . . . owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Secretary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among
such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such dis-
tribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations,
trades, or businesses."
166 I.R.C. § 663 (c); see notes 146 and 154 supra.
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as presently defined, to be considered as separate, the interest must
be substantially the same as if separate trusts had been created,167
the corpus interest of one beneficiary cannot affect the income in-
terest of another beneficiary,168 and the concept is not applicable
to loss or deduction carryovers on termination.169 Separate trusts,
segregation of assets, or separate individual beneficiaries are not
required,170 but the requirements still appear to demand at least
a capability of operation as an independent unit.
My suggestion would be that the separate share rule should,
in the case of estates, be broadened to cover any separate interest
which is discernible in fact, whether of income or corpus, or both.
This rule would engulf the present specific bequest exclusion so
far as estates are concerned.' 7' The specific bequest would be a
discernible share and would be permitted to operate as such. The
segregation of income and corpus elements would be handled under
the distribution system discussed below.
The operation of this sort of a separate share rule is basically
a tracing concept, but a different type of tracing would be involved
than was used under the 1939 Code. Under the old code, the attempt
was to trace items of income through the estate to the ultimate re-
cipients. My attempt is to trace the various interests of the estate
into their respective or separate shares. True, not every interest
is capable of being excised in this manner and of having its own
definitized boundaries. But many items involving either corpus
or income or both will be distinguishable, and in these cases the
federal income tax may be keyed to taxing that share in terms of
its ultimate recipient. It should be pointed out that this rule would
come into play only after x-months and then only if the Commis-
sioner has not specified some other method for reflecting clearly
the estate's income. Under the existing code, a separate corpus
interest may be denied separate share treatment because related
income does not also operate as a separate share. 7 2 Actually, that
167 See Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(a).
168 Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(b).
169 Reg. § 1.663(c)-l(b) (4).
170 Reg. §§ 1.663(c)-I(c), 1.663(c)-3(c).
171 I.R.C. § 663 (a) (1). It is also intended that the three installment aspect
of this rule would be unnecessary under the proposed separate share rules
and distributable net income tier system. In appropriate situations, it
could be made applicable as a part of the trust income taxation rules where
the Commissioner, exercising his section 482 type power, feels this is
warranted.
172 See Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(b).
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income may well be operating as a separate, separate share, and,
especially if the throwback rules become applicable, it would seem
wise to treat the income interest as its own separate share. It would
also seem wise to permit marital deduction formula bequests to
operate as separate shares, at least with respect to the corpus por-
tion, so as to preclude a possible double unknown valuation problem.
Perhaps this separate share rule is more a separate interest rule.
The attempt to trace income under the 1939 rules became a form
of shell game. But the executor in managing an estate must be able
to identify the various interests in the estate, and to account event-
ually to the court for their satisfaction. To this extent, there is
a breakdown of the estate into its many interest elements and
eventually a coordination of amounts received with those interests.
It is recognized that this analysis is an oversimplification, and that
many estates will not fall into this type of neat pattern. Still, where
the executor is able to pattern his estate into discernible shares, the
estate should be given the full benefit of this treatment. Since
separate share treatment would not be elective, it should be geared
to fiduciary accounting so that it would not have an element of
second guess (or second computation) in rearranging the executor's
records. And it does seem that separate share treatment should
be applicable to loss and deduction carryovers upon complete or
partial termination, for these are the points at which separate shares
may be most significant and also most readily reflected in the fi-
duciary records.
So designed, the separate share rule would remove much of the
stress from a tier system relating to distributions. I would propose
the following tier system, but it should again be noted that this tier
system would come into play only after the expiration of x-months.
(1) first tier: all distributions of current year's income would
be includable by the beneficiaries and deductible by the estate; but
any additional required income distributions (and the term should
include bequests required by the governing instrument or applicable
state law to be paid at any time out of the current year's income)
should be taxed to the estate.
(2) second tier: operating as the present second tier on any
income not taxed under the first tier to either the beneficiaries or
to the estate.
This would operate essentially as the proposed American Law
Institute Alternative I, but with one structural change. The first
tier as presently drawn is comparatively meaningless to an estate.
It is difficult to qualify for a required distribution, apart from an
actual distribution, or to allocate classes of income to different bene-
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ficiaries. 173 Yet, there seems to be an agreement that the testator
should be in a position to spell out bequests of the income during
administration if he desires; and such bequests should not, because
of federal income tax considerations, materially disrupt a probate
administration. There will be cases in which a partial corpus dis-
tribution would be possible but an income distribution would need
to await a more complete accounting by the executor. The American
Law Institute draft partially alleviates the situation by providing
that any income which is in fact distributed is in the first tier. This
may assist some estates. But it does not provide sufficient freedom
for testator planning, and, as a result, many attempted first tier de-
vices will fall back into the second tier, if current income payment
is not possible during the year. And even if undistributed income
payments were within the contemplated first tier, it would seem
unfair to tax the estate beneficiary (as contrasted with a trust bene-
ficiary) in advance of distribution.
The proposed tier system taxes some income to the estate ahead
of the second tier, instead of merely putting all income up for tax-
ation to the beneficiaries. Required distributions to be paid at any
time out of the current year's income may remain taxable to the
estate during the current year. This gives the testator more freedom
than under the present rules to plan the actual income tax allocation
within his probate estate. Such freedom results from the broadened
separate share rules which will include a wholly income share if
it is in fact separate, and in giving the first tier the broader meaning
consistent with normal probate estate operation. Thus, testator's
direction to pay a class of current income to B, whether to be paid
currently or at the completion of administration, would eventually
be taxed or charged to B and not to a beneficiary who merely hap-
pens to receive a second tier distribution in the year the income
is earned.
To assist in taxing the income to B, the actual recipient, in those
cases in which the administration has exceeded x-months, the
throwback rules 74 could also be made applicable. The present time
limits on the throwback period would no doubt be sufficient, but
they, should not be used, in order to avoid any temptation for an
unduly extended administration. It is assumed that in the process
of revision of Subchapter J, the working mechanics of the throw-
back rules will be improved so as to eliminate the complexities of
173 Discussed above, pages 347-348.
174 I.R.C. §§ 665-668.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
operation and inequities of the present rules.175
This analysis does not fully resolve the issues involved in es-
tablishing a workable mechanism for the income taxation of estates.
Most of the problems discussed in Part II would be solved for the
administration which is completed within x-months. A number
of questions for the estate which continues beyond that time have
been left unresolved, and only a primary superstructure has been
presented. The main problems would be to integrate into this
system a treatment for corpus gains and expenses and charitable
distributions. 176 It is felt, however, that much of the present strain
which these problems place on the present system would be re-
moved by the revised approach. The most significant contribution
of a revised distribution plan would be to reduce the areas in which
the executor is presently forced to make significant tax decisions
which can have valuable financial consequences with respect to
competing interest groups within the estate. This is an impediment
which the federal income tax law places in state probate administra-
tions. To the extent the federal tax law attempts to untangle the
interests of the estate recipients in the same general manner as the
state probate courts, the impediment is reduced.
Present sentiment may be shifting toward simplified treatment
of estate income taxation even at the expense of having certain
imperfections in the tax system.177 Whether an elective method
within x-months is worth the complexity it would add appears
doubtful, but an election might be useful in some cases. As a matter
of securing legislative relief, one can only speculate whether it is
more desirable to present a single simplified plan which may have
some inequities, or two plans and an election which may come closer
175 These problems relate primarily to the method in which tax pay-
ments by the estate are treated. See Kamin, Surrey, and Warren, The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 Colum.
L. Rev. 1237, 1251 (1954); ALI Fed. Income, Estate and Gift Tax Stat. 122-8
(Tent. Draft No. 11, 1956). The present rules may operate unfairly with
respect to different trust beneficiaries. The beneficiary getting the first
accumulation distribution also receives a tax advantage as compared with
later accumulation distributees. But, with respect to the individual bene-
ficiary, himself, the tax can be no higher than if distribution had been
made in the year of accumulation, I.R.C. § 668 (a), although his individual
tax on the distribution may be less than the tax credit which he receives
in the year of distribution.
176 This appears to have been effectively undertaken in the Advisory
Group Report, notes 153 and 155 supra.
177 See, e.g., statement of Stanley S. Surrey, 1956 A.L.I. Proceedings 714;
notes 159 and 160 supra.
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to making everyone happy. From the practical nature of legislative
evolution, the next step in the federal tax law may be in the direc-
tion suggested by the American Law Institute in 1952-one really
simple scheme to take care of run of the mill estates (which will be
most of them by number), and one detailed set of rules reaching
a more precisely equitable result in those estates where the desired
tax consequences are worth the added effort of dealing with a more
difficult tax scheme. The choice would be made by the executor
managing the estate, based upon all the characteristics of the par-
ticular arrangement. Granted that such an elective treatment
would be of advantage to some estates, it does not appear that it is
necessary to introduce a generally applicable elective alternative
method rather than to merely inject liberalizing aspects into the
simplified method providing relief to the specific type of situations
for which relief is desired. In this manner, Congress would be pin-
pointing the recipients of its benefits, instead of simply offering a
better bargain to all estates, which would force even the relatively
small estates to do a certain amount of shopping before knowing
just which law to apply.
If an alternative method is introduced into the code for the
period within x-months, then I would recommend the post-x-months
plan outlined above in preference to the general trust rules. This
plan would more nearly fit even the initial probate administration
activity than the present trust rules which are not adapted to the
problems of the estate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even if the present estate income tax rules were to be strictly
applied, which may not be the case due to their complexity, the tax
consequences of normal probate administration functions would
seem to take on a distorted significance. It is one thing to say that
because of the nature and operation of an estate there should be
substantial opportunities for minimization of tax, and another to
make those opportunities a weapon which can alter the rights of
conflicting interests within the estate. Many illustrations have been
given of the coincidence of a favorable income tax allocation poten-
tial under the present law and a cause of action on behalf of some
specific interest in the estate which will suffer from such an allo-
cation. This may mean that the instances where it will be possible
to get everyone together on maximum tax savings arrangements
will approach the close family situations where the income tax gen-
erally attempts to preclude a free apportionment of the mere tax
burden.
The situation should not be viewed as discouraging. Progress
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in perfecting a tax structure is the result of a patient altering and
realtering of the machinery to perform the particular tasks which
are asked of it. Subchapter J of the 1954 Code has brought with it
many notable advances in the science of taxing trusts and estates,
but, unfortunately, these have been directed more toward trusts
than estates.
It does seem that the time is now ripe for designing a specialized
set of code provisions tailored to fit the estate's own methods of
operation. This is essentially a problem of providing a workable
mechanism for handling estate distributions. For the most part,
separate entity treatment would appear to be appropriate. This
should have a substantial effect in reducing the consequences of
timing the probate administration activities to fit into the various
income tax returns. Perhaps, there is also justification for treating
this entity as a part of the family income unit, where it is in fact
a part of such a unit.
Beyond this, if it is felt that in some situations taxing the estate's
income to the precise individual beneficiary receiving it is worth
the added complexity in probate estate administration and income
tax administration, then a specific set of provisions covering those
situations should be created for probate estates, and the present
trust comparison abandoned. The basis for a set of such provisions
has been presented and it is suggested that this scheme would be
more suited to estate operation than the existing provisions.
It is hoped that whatever revised statutory treatment evolves,
the federal income taxation of estates will result in the least pos-
sible interference with a normal probate administration of decedents'
estates.
